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TOWARD A BETTER COMPETITION POLICY FOR THE MEDIA:
THE CHALLENGE OF DEVELOPING ANTITRUST POLICIES THAT
SUPPORT THE MEDIA SECTOR’S UNIQUE ROLE IN OUR
DEMOCRACY.
Maurice E. Stucke∗ & Allen P. Grunes†‡
It is difficult to formulate meaningful competition policy when
there is a fierce debate over the current competitiveness of the
media industry. After addressing the importance of the
marketplace of ideas in our democracy, our article examines
the current state of the media industry, including the response
of traditional media to audience declines, the growth of new
media, the impact of media consolidation (including its impact
on minority and women ownership), and the role of the Internet.
In response to recent calls for liberalizing cross-ownership
rules to protect traditional media, our article outlines why
conventional antitrust policy is difficult to apply in media
markets, and how the concerns underlying media mergers differ
from other industries. Our article recommends first that
Congress should take the lead in formulating a national media
policy, second, an agenda for the agencies to look beyond a
merger’s impact on advertising rates and more empirical work
on media mergers’ impact on the marketplace of ideas, and
finally ways the government can promote access to the
marketplace of ideas.
INTRODUCTION
Two concerns traditionally have been raised about large media
enterprises. First, media giants may raise prices to consumers and
∗

Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law.
Partner, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, LLP.
‡
The authors, while at the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, investigated
mergers and anticompetitive restraints in the media industry. The authors would like to
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and Irwin Stelzer for their helpful comments. An earlier version of this article was part of
the American Antitrust Institute’s transition report for the incoming Administration.
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ANTITRUST INSTITUTE’S TRANSITION REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY TO THE 44TH
PRESIDENT (2008). The authors were the principal authors of a committee document that
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advertisers above competitive levels. This concern about corporate market
power cuts across all industries. The second concern is media-specific,
namely society’s political and cultural health is fostered by numerous,
independent media, and excessive media concentration may threaten the
public’s access to important information or viewpoints.1
The Obama administration will confront both concerns. As thenSenator Barack Obama and Senator John Kerry observed, the “thoughtful
exchange of diverse viewpoints not only helps guarantee our freedoms as
individuals, it ensures those in power can be held accountable for all that
they do.”2 Given President Obama’s concerns about media consolidation, a
change in media policies is likely. But what form will such change take,
especially given that traditional media are in flux? In response to declining
audiences and advertising revenue, many traditional media have laid off
journalists and cut back on news. The daily newspaper has been called an
“endangered species”3

with one prediction that “more newspapers and

newspaper groups will default, be shut down and be liquidated in 2009 and
several cities could go without a daily print newspaper by 2010.”4 What
this means for antitrust policy is hotly contested. The financial setbacks of
traditional media have led some to call for further relaxation of media
ownership restrictions.

This argument has been supported by the

recognition that the Internet has lowered entry barriers and introduced new
outlets.
accepted suggestions from, and was edited by, others at the AAI.
1
William B. Shew & Irwin M. Stelzer, A Policy Framework for the Media Industries
in MARKETS AND THE MEDIA: COMPETITION, REGULATION AND THE INTERESTS OF
CONSUMERS 111 (M.E. Beasley et al., eds. 1996).
2
U.S. Senators Barack Obama & John F. Kerry, Media Consolidation Silences
Diverse
Voices,
POLITICO,
Nov.
8,
2007,
available
at
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1107/6758.html.
3
Kevin J. Martin, The Daily Show, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 13, 2007.
4
Michael Hirschorn, End Times, THE ATLANTIC, Jan./Feb. 2009, available at
http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200901/new-york-times.
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Nonetheless, most Americans continue to get their news and
information primarily from television and newspapers, and traditional
media companies own many of the most popular Internet news sites. Critics
of media consolidation have argued that it has had a negative impact on
quality and choice.

Moreover, they recognize that an emerging and

increasingly more competitive new media market does not warrant ignoring
antitrust enforcement in major media formats.
It is difficult for the incoming administration to formulate meaningful
policy when there is a fierce debate about whether a problem really exists.
Thus, our principal recommendation is to get a better grasp on the
fundamental issues: Are media industries becoming more concentrated or
not? Where is the audience going for its news? What weight should be
given to alternatives such as blogs? Have there been adverse effects from
prior media mergers? Have the predicted efficiencies occurred? Aside
from price and output concerns, what is the impact on the quality and
diversity of viewpoints when media outlets fall into the hands of fewer
owners and those owners are less likely to include minority and women
owners?
Part I of this article addresses the importance of the marketplace of
ideas in our democracy. Part II examines the current state of the media
industry, including the response of traditional media to audience declines,
the growth of new media, the impact of media consolidation (including its
impact on minority and women ownership), and the role of the Internet.
Part III responds to the calls for liberalization to protect traditional media.
We argue that media industries differ from other industries and one must
move beyond a laissez-faire attitude.
proposals for the Obama administration.

Part IV concludes with some
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HOW A VIBRANT MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS PROMOTES DEMOCRACY
AND THE FREE MARKET

A competitive “marketplace of ideas”5 plays an important role in our
democracy.6 Its beneficial social value is based on the theory that truth
prevails in the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources. An essential goal of the First Amendment is to
promote this marketplace of ideas by restricting to varying degrees
governmental restraints on speech, and achieving “the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources.”7
The question invariably arises whether the First Amendment restricts
the government’s ability to regulate media ownership or, rather, supports
such an effort. Some media owners see attempts to limit ownership as
burdening their ability to speak to as many people as they can through the
acquisition of additional media.

This interpretation of the First

Amendment, supported by statements by the D.C. Circuit in Time Warner
Entertainment Co. v. FCC,8 views the beneficiaries as corporations and the
First Amendment as a vehicle to keep government away from their
5

The marketplace of ideas is a sphere in which intangible values compete for
acceptance. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE, UNABRIDGED 1383 (Merriam-Webster 1986). See Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by
free trade in ideas . . . the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market[.]”).
6
The marketplace of ideas is important to our democracy, in that democracy prospers
when there is an unrestrained flow of information. First, to govern themselves, the
electorate must have full access to “social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas and
experiences.” Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). Second, the best
test of truth is the success of an idea in gaining acceptance in free competition with other
ideas. Just as competition produces the best widget, so too competition in the marketplace
of ideas advances truth. See U.S. v. Assoc. Press (“AP I”), 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y.
1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (“AP II”). While to many this marketplace of ideas “is, and
always will be, folly,” we, in our democracy, “have staked upon it our all.” AP I, 52 F.
Supp. at 372; see also Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the Marketplace
of Ideas, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 249 (2001).
7
AP II, 326 U.S. at 20.
8
Time Warner Ent. Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1128-29 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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expressive freedom.9
But a better reading of the First Amendment, one more in tune with
Supreme Court precedent, is that “the right of the viewers and listeners,”
not the right of the owners, “is paramount.”10 Mergers and acquisitions
may have a positive or negative effect from the consumer’s standpoint.
Mergers may create a strong voice where none existed before; on the other
hand, they may reduce the number of voices and thus inhibit the robustness
of debate. In tandem with First Amendment principles, the federal antitrust
laws can promote the marketplace of ideas by reaching anticompetitive
private restraints on this marketplace.11 “[A]s the Supreme Court has
recognized, in promoting diversity in sources of information,” wrote Judge
Greene in the AT&T case, “the values underlying the First Amendment

9

The argument that the government should not limit the rights of media conglomerates
depends on several assumptions. First, it assumes that laws that regulate business conduct
such as mergers are equivalent to laws that prohibit specific communicative content, which
is the defining feature of censorship of speech. Second, the corporation is the ultimate and
proper beneficiary of press freedom. Third, structural rules as appropriately evaluated
under a heightened level of scrutiny. C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND
DEMOCRACY: WHY OWNERSHIP MATTERS 127-28 (2006).
10
Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 389. In AP II, Justice Black rejected AP’s
argument that it should have the autonomy to control its own operations and its own
associations with newspapers without government interference: “the First Amendment, far
from providing an argument against application of the Sherman Act, here provides
powerful reasons to the contrary.” AP II, 326 U.S. at 20. That this is the proper
interpretation may be seen from the fact that telephone companies, as common carriers,
must carry expression that their owners would find objectionable, and from the widespread
requirements that both broadcasters and cable systems must carry content that they would
reject. Under this view, the application of antitrust laws is in tune with the First
Amendment because “[the First] Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to
the welfare of the public.” AP II, 326 U.S. at 20.
11
Stucke & Grunes, supra note 6, at 252. The Supreme Court and lower courts have
made this link explicit. See, e.g., FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775,
800 n.18 (1978) (“application of the antitrust laws to newspapers is not only consistent
with, but is actually supportive of the values underlying, the First Amendment”); Red Lion
Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 390 (“the purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to
countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a
private licensee”).
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coincide with the policy of the antitrust laws.”12
In promoting a competitive marketplace of ideas, competition
agencies, in turn, can promote the objectives of competition generally.13 A
competitive media, for example, increases political accountability and
reduces corruption, which hampers any competition policy. As Professor
Ed Baker writes, “Concentrated communicative power creates demagogic
dangers for a democracy, reduces the number of owners who can choose to
engage in watchdog roles, may reduce the variety in perspectives among the
smaller group of people who hold ultimate power to choose specific
(varying) watchdog projects, and multiplies the probable conflicts of
interest that can muzzle those watchdogs.”14
II. CONCERNS ABOUT THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE MARKETPLACE OF
IDEAS
Given the importance of a vibrant marketplace of ideas to our
democracy and free market system, the Obama administration will face the
ongoing debate over the health and competitiveness of the U.S. news
media.15 We first examine the health and competitiveness of traditional
12

U.S. v. AT&T Corp., 552 F. Supp. 131, 176 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Md. v.
U.S., 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). Some have argued that consideration of First Amendment
values should persuade antitrust law to seek a higher than usual level of competition in
media markets. See, e.g., Wilfred Rumble, The FCC’s Reliance on Market Incentives to
Provide Diverse Viewpoints on Critical Issues of Public Importance Violates the First
Amendment Right to Receive Critical Information, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 793 (1994). For a
general review of such arguments, see Federal Trade Comm’n, Proceedings of the
Symposium on Media Concentration, Dec. 14-15, 1978, at 22 et seq. (remarks of Professor
Monroe Price, UCLA Law School).
13
An independent and competitive media, for example, (1) informs policy makers of
the unintended social effects of their policies, (2) provides a voice to pressure the
government for change, and (3) serves as a catalyst for institutional change to promote
competition policy. For a discussion how an independent competitive media can advance
the goals of competition policy, see Maurice E. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, 82
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 951, 1020-25 (2008).
14
Baker, supra note 9, at 120-21.
15
Senator Kohl recently summarized the concerns that media consolidation has on the
marketplace of ideas:
It's such a very important issue, media consolidation, because it has the
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media, given its reduction of journalists and output. After looking at the
growth of new media, we next examine the impact of media consolidation
on the marketplace of ideas generally, and on women and minority
ownership of the media in particular.
A. Health and Competitiveness of Traditional Media
The media industry is in flux.

In recent years, some media

conglomerates have shed,16 while others have increased, their holdings.17
potential to reduce if not eliminate the opportunities people have to read and think
about differing opinions and independent opinions. If this were to happen, it
would have a devastating impact on our society and our democracy. So I believe
both the FCC and the antitrust enforcement agencies, and our Antitrust
Subcommittee, all have an important role to play in addressing this issue. . . . We
need to be very much on guard to see to it that media consolidation doesn't happen
to the extent that we have a society where the Fourth Estate has lost its
spontaneity, its vigor, and its ability to encourage debate and to get people
thinking. It's so important to our democracy. Multiplicity of independent
ownership and vigorous competition is what is essential. If we have just a few
companies that control vast portions of the media, I cannot imagine how that's in
the interest of anyone, except of course media owners who would profit greatly. In
sum, I believe it is very important that we in government-including here in
Congress and in the antitrust enforcement agencies too-stand in the way of
excessive media consolidation. And I understand that this may make some people
in the private sector upset because they think maybe you're going too far. But if
you gave me the choice of going too far and not going far enough, in the effort to
keep the media as independent and competitive as we can, I'd rather go too far
than not go far enough.
ANTITRUST: So it sounds like you believe that this issue of preserving
diversity of viewpoint should be a part-perhaps a big part-of the antitrust review.
SENATOR KOHL: Yes, very much so. I strongly believe that antitrust
enforcement agencies should be aware of, and consider, the likely effects on
diversity and the marketplace of ideas when they review a media merger.
Interview With U.S. Senator Herb Kohl [D-Wi], Chairman, Antitrust Subcommittee, 21SPG ANTITRUST 7, 12 (2007).
16
In 2005, Viacom split into two separate companies: Viacom and CBS Corporation.
In 2006, Clear Channel Communications and CBS, the largest and second largest radio
holders, announced plans to sell some of their radio and television stations. Clear Channel
announced selling 448 “non-core” radio stations, all in markets outside the top 100, and its
entire television station group, which collectively contributed less than 10 percent of the
company’s 2005 revenues. Press Release, Clear Channel Announces Plan to Sell Radio
Stations Outside the Top 100 Markets and Entire Television Station Group, Nov. 16, 2006,
http://www.clearchannel.com/Corporate/PressRelease.aspx?PressReleaseID=1825
(last
visited May 23, 2008). (As of its most recent 10-K, Clear Channel sold 217 non-core radio
stations and reached definitive purchase agreements to sell 28 more “non-core” radio
stations. In 2007, Clear Channel entered into a definitive agreement with an affiliate of

8
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And traditional media companies have expanded their Internet holdings, or
sought to collaborate with well-known Internet companies.18
Many traditional news media are losing their audience. Daily
newspapers and alternative newsweeklies have lost circulation for their
print editions,19 as their readership ages.20 In recent years, ratings for cable
Providence Equity Partners Inc. to sell its television business. Subsequently, Providence
informed Clear Channel that it is considering its options under the definitive agreement,
including not closing the acquisition on the terms and conditions in the definitive
agreement. http://www.clearchannel.com/Investors/Documents/291.pdf. After 2005, CBS
sold 11 television and 39 radio stations in medium and smaller-markets, leaving it with 29
TV stations and 140 radio stations. John Eggerton, CBS Sells Four Stations to Four Points
Media Group Completes Deal, Divestiture of 50 Medium and Smaller-Market Stations,
BROADCASTING
&
CABLE,
Jan.
10,
2008,
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6521802.html (last visited May 23, 2008). In
2007, Walt Disney Co. sold 22 big-city radio stations to Citadel for approximately $2.7
billion. (Citadel's entire stock-market value dropped in 2008 to under $300 million, which
is a fraction of the value for its purchase of the Disney radio stations completed eight
months earlier. Paul Farhi, Strapped Owner Fires WMAL Host Chris Core, WASH. POST,
March 1, 2008, at C01.) The New York Times Company sold its television stations. On
May 7, 2007, the New York Times Company sold its Broadcast Media Group, consisting
of nine network-affiliated television stations, their related Web sites and the digital
operating center, to Oak Hill Capital Partners, for approximately $575 million. New York
Times Company Annual Report (Form 10-K) at P1-P2 (Feb. 26, 2008).
17
In 2007, News Corporation, which has major holdings in filmed entertainment,
television, cable network programming, direct broadcast satellite television, magazines,
newspapers, and book publishing, acquired for approximately $5.6 billion the Dow Jones
& Company, Inc. Rivals Sirius Satellite Radio and XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc.
merged, unopposed by the DOJ. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Press Release, Statement of the
Department Of Justice Antitrust Division on Its Decision To Close Its Investigation Of XM
Satellite Radio Holdings Inc.’s Merger With Sirius Satellite Radio Inc. (Mar. 24, 2008),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2008/231467.pdf. The FCC
also approved the merger with minor conditions, even though the FCC earlier when
auctioning the only two satellite digital audio radio service licenses specifically prohibited
one company from owning both licenses. Cheryl Bolen, XM, Sirius Accept Consent
Decree to Secure FCC Approval of Merger, BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. DAILY, July
25, 2008.
18
Network TV, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20.
19
Between 1950 and 2007, the circulation and number of United States daily
newspapers has steadily declined from 1,772 newspapers with a collective daily circulation
of 58,881,746 to 1,422 newspapers with a collective daily circulation of 50,742,000.
NEWSPAPER ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, THE SOURCE–NEWSPAPERS BY THE NUMBERS
(2008), available at http://www.naa.org/TrendsandNumbers/Total-Paid-Circulation.aspx.
This decline is attributable to evening newspapers; the number of morning newspapers
(some of which are former afternoon newspapers) increased from 322 newspapers with a
collective circulation over 24 million to 867 morning newspapers with a daily circulation
over 44 million. Id.
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and network national news and local televised news have declined.21 For
the three traditional networks’ evening newscasts, the number of viewers in
2006 was half its 1980 level, with the median age of the networks’ nightly
news viewers at 60 years.22 Between 1998 and 2006, the commercial radio
audience has declined as well.23 (A notable exception, National Public
Radio, had an increase in listeners.24) Americans have a less favorable view
of the press, partly due to the perception of greater bias.25

Although

traditional media have attracted new readers to their websites, their online
revenues have been unable to support their news operations.26
Consequently, even The New York Times Company, with its popular online
news website (which attracted 20 million unique users for the month of
20

Project for Excellence in Journalism, Newspapers, in THE STATE OF THE NEWS
MEDIA 2008 (2008) (in 2007, 33% of 18-to-24 year olds and 34% of 25-yo34-year olds
read
a
newspaper
in
an
average
week),
available
at
http://www.stateofthenewsmedia.org/2008/index.php [hereinafter 2008 PEJ Report].
21
Overview, 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20. The average audience for the three main
cable news channels declined in 2006. Project for Excellence in Journalism, Cable TV, in
THE
STATE
OF
THE
NEWS
MEDIA
2007
(2007),
available
at
http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2007/index.asp [hereinafter 2007 PEJ Report]. In 2007,
viewership increased by about 3%, but viewership overall is below levels from the early
2000s. Cable TV, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20.
22
Network TV, 2007 PEJ Report, supra note 20. In 2007, viewership experienced a
steeper decline of 5% or 1.2 million fewer viewers, and the median age of nightly news
viewers increased to 61 years old. Network TV, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20.
23
The average number of radio listeners per quarter hour, based on Arbitron, has fallen
6.6 percent: from approximately 19.7 million to approximately 18.4 million. GEORGE
WILLIAMS, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REVIEW OF THE RADIO INDUSTRY
2007 14-15, available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-073470A11.pdf. The author of the report noted that further analysis was necessary to test
whether there was a causal link between industry consolidation and this decline in
listenership. Alternative explanations could include the availability of alternative products,
such as satellite radio, Internet radio, and downloading of digital music.
24
Radio, 2007 PEJ Report, supra note 20.
25
Overview, 2007 PEJ Report, supra note 20. A recent national poll found significantly
declining percentages of Americans saying they believe all or most of media news
reporting. Just 19.6% of those surveyed could say they believe all or most news media
reporting, down from 27.4% in 2003. Sacred Heart University News, Americans Slam
News
Media
on
Believability
(Jan.
8,
2008),
http://www.sacredheart.edu/pages/20786_americans_slam_news_media_on_believability.c
fm (last visited May 23, 2008).
26
Overview, 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20.
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October 2008, making it the fifth-ranked news site on the Internet in terms
of total visitors), faces the prospect of defaulting on some $400 million in
debt, leading some to question its future viability.27
B. Traditional Media’s Reduction in Output
With circulation and advertising revenue declining, traditional media
companies—the large broadcasters, newspaper and magazine publishers—
generally have responded to these audience declines by reducing costs.
Some cost savings may be a result of efficiencies such as back office
savings, a move to cheaper delivery alternatives, or outsourcing certain
functions. Many major media companies, however, continue to lay off
journalists,28 close news bureaus here29 and abroad,30 cut back on news
coverage, and offer more “hit-and-run” and less investigative journalism.31
27

Michael Hirschorn, End Times, THE ATLANTIC, Jan./Feb. 2009 (quoting Fitch
Ratings), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200901/new-york-times.
28
Between 2000 and 2005, newsroom staffing at daily newspapers declined by 3,000
or about 5%, with greater layoffs expected. From 2002 to 2006, news division staffing on
the network televisions dropped about 10%. Layoffs at the major news magazines (such as
Time, Newsweek) and network news programs had even greater percentages. Overview,
2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20. In contrast, newsroom staffing is increasing for local
television news and the ethnic newspapers. Id.; see also DAVID H. WEAVER ET AL., THE
AMERICAN JOURNALIST IN THE 21ST CENTURY: U.S. NEWS PEOPLE AT THE DAWN OF A NEW
MILLENNIUM 2 (2007) (decline of approximately 6,000 full-time people or 5% working in
the news between June 1992 and November 2002). The number of total newspaper
employment, which increased between 1970 and 1990, has declined annually thereafter.
NEWSPAPER ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, THE SOURCE (data for 1970 – 2003),
http://www.naa.org/info/facts04/employment.html.
29
Stephen Foley, The Writing's On The Wall For The Old-Style American Newspaper,
THE
INDEPENDENT,
Dec.
15,
2008,
available
at
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/press/the-writings-on-the-wall-for-the-oldstyleamerican-newspaper-1066695.html. As newspapers seek to cut costs further, for example,
“more and more of them come to view Washington bureaus as luxuries they simply cannot
afford” and “have eliminated more than 40 Washington regional reporter positions through
layoffs, buyouts or attrition.” Jennifer Dorroh, Endangered Species: Many newspapers
are laying off the reporters who monitor the federal government from a local angle. The
cost
could
be
steep,
AJR,
Dec./Jan.
2009,
available
at
http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4645.
30
Newspapers, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20.
31
One study of news coverage in 48 media outlets and five media sectors found a
number of stories “that were big events that flashed across the media landscape and then
vanished almost instantly, with less follow-up than one might have expected.” Overview,
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Radio stations carry less local news.32 Local television stations increased
the production of news, but without significantly adding journalists, leading
to less original reporting and greater reliance on non-original material33 or
sharing news with rival stations.34 One weekly news magazine in 2008

in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20; see also Eric Alterman, The News Business: Out of
Print, NEW YORKER, March 31, 2008, at 49. The major broadcast news networks, for
example, have reduced staffing, halved the number of overseas news bureaus, and aired
46% fewer foreign stories since the late 1980s. Network TV, 2007 PEJ Report, supra note
20. Moreover, the historic 22 minutes of news in a 30-minute evening network news
broadcast had shrunk by 2007 to an average of 18.6 minutes (ABC had an average of 18.1
minutes of news per night; CBS had 18.7 minutes; and NBC had 18.8 minutes). Network
TV, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20. As one newspaper industry analyst commented,
rather than innovating “most newspaper companies concentrated on shoring up the
profitability of their traditional newsprint-oriented business, chiefly through laying off
employees, downsizing their newspapers and cutting back on circulation in distant areas of
little interest to advertisers in their core markets.” John Morton, Buffeted, Newspapers Are
Paying The Price For Shortsighted Thinking, AMERICAN JOURNALISM REV. (Oct./Nov.
2007), available at http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4416.
32
In 2006 radio stations on average aired each day 37.1 minutes of locally produced
news, of which 20.2 minutes was aired during the morning drive. Bob Papper, By The
Numbers: News, Staffing and Profitability Survey, COMMUNICATOR 34 (O c t. 2006)
(RTNDA/Ball
State
University
Survey),
available
at
http://www.rtnda.org/media/pdfs/communicator/2006/oct/102006-22-34.pdf. As the article
notes, “There’s little positive news on the radio side. Both the average amount of news and
average staff size fell from a year ago. While consolidation makes it difficult to track radio
news over time, it’s clear that the overall trend is down. The typical radio news director
oversees three to four stations, and more than three-quarters of radio news directors also
have non-news responsibilities.”
33
Local TV, 2007 PEJ Report, supra note 20; Statement of FCC Commissioner
Michael J. Copps, Concurs and Dissents in Part in Promoting Diversification of Ownership
in the Broadcasting Services et al., MB Docket Nos. 07-294, 06-121, 02-277, 01-235, 01317, 00-244, and 04-228 (Dec. 18, 2007) (“We have witnessed the number of statehouse
and city hall reporters declining decade after decade, despite an explosion in state and local
lobbying.”).
34
One estimate is that 200 local television stations get news from other news stations,
and 37% of surveyed local news directors said in 2006 that they shared content with other
local television stations. Local TV, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20. For non-affiliated
commercial television station, 50 percent of the news directors said they shared content in
2006, compared to none the year before. Id. See also Some news-sharing alliances that
emerged
in
2008,
Associated
Press,
Jan.
4,
2009,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5i7FAq8T8VDAgw6niCtOGlxaPo4
XgD95GFR7O0; Staci D. Kramer, Washington Post, Baltimore Sun Will Share Some
Sports, Maryland Coverage, WASH. POST., Dec. 23, 2008, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/12/23/AR2008122302459.html.
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went monthly.35 With the recent financial crisis, more newspapers are
expected to cut home delivery, migrate from print to online-only editions, or
shut down entirely.36
Although their profit margins have shrunk, many daily newspapers
and television stations remain profitable, indeed, more profitable than other
industries.37 This has led skeptics to dispute the claim that newspapers and
35

Richard Perez-Pena, U.S. News Will Become a Monthly Magazine, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 2008.
36
See Stephanie Clifford, Christian Science Paper to End Daily Print Edition, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2008. Moreover, the ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL, New Mexico's largest daily
newspaper, announced in 2009 it was stopping home deliveries and rack sales in more than
30 communities around the state because of the economic downturn, leaving readers with
online or mail delivery. This follows the Detroit Free Press and Detroit News, which in
2008, limited home delivery to three days a week (Thursday, Friday and Sunday), and the
San Antonio (Texas) Express-News, which stopped home delivery and single-copy sales in
parts of South Texas. Albuquerque Journal To Halt Some Home Deliveries, INT’L HERALD
TRIB.,
Jan.
8,
2009,
available
at
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2009/01/08/america/Albuquerque-Journal-HomeDeliveries.php; Dramatic Changes Unveiled at The News, Free Press, DETROIT NEWS,
Dec.
16,
2008,
at
http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20081216/METRO/812160419.
In
January 2009, Hearst announced that it was putting the Seattle Post-Intelligencer (and its
interest in a joint operating agreement with the Seattle Times) up for sale, with the
expectation that if no buyer was found within 60 days the paper would either become a
Web-only operation or cease publishing entirely. For sale: The P-I, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER,
Jan.
9,
2009,
available
at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/395463_newspapersale10.html .
37
As one newspaper industry analyst wrote, “Bad as 2007 has been, the publicly
reporting companies still produced an average operating-profit margin of nearly 16 percent
in the first half of the year--a level many businesses can never hope to achieve. Still, the
average profit margin has been in steady decline since 2002, when it was 22.3 percent.”
John Morton, Buffeted, Newspapers Are Paying The Price For Shortsighted Thinking,
AMERICAN
JOURNALISM
REV.
(Oct./Nov.
2007),
available
at
http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4416. That same analyst in reviewing the financials of
publicly held newspapers through September 2008 noted that despite a nearly 40 percent
decline in operating profits, the operating profit margins, subject to certain adjustments,
were 11.3 percent. John Morton, It Could Be Worse, AMERICAN JOURNALISM REV.,
Dec./Jan. 2009, available at http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4660; see also Newspapers,
in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20 (newspaper industry’s pre-tax margin was
approximately 18.5% in 2007); Statement of FCC Commissioner Michael J. Copps,
Concurs and Dissents in Part in Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the
Broadcasting Services et al., MB Docket Nos. 07-294, 06-121, 02-277, 01-235, 01-317, 00244, & 04-228 (Dec. 18, 2007) (“We shed crocodile tears for the financial plight of
newspapers—yet the truth is that newspaper profits are about double the S&P 500
average.”),
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
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other traditional media are going the way of the buggy whip. Nonetheless,
even before the recent recession, many publicly-traded media companies,
despite double-digit profit margins, lost favor on Wall Street.38

Some

companies saddled by debt from recent acquisitions had a tougher time
meeting their debt obligation during this recession, most notably the
Tribune Company and Star Tribune of Minneapolis, which entered
bankruptcy.39

In this current recession, media companies’ advertising

revenues and profits are expected to deteriorate further.
C. Growth of New Media
Today consumers can access news and entertainment from personal
digital audio and video devices (such as iPods, WiFi, mobile phones,
WiMAX, and mp3 players), subscriber-based satellite digital radio service
(with numerous niche formats), direct broadcast satellite systems, Internet
279035A3.pdf. Likewise, the president of station brokerage business recently said, “Wall
Street has walked away from broadcast investments because they don’t see the growth that
the industry has had over the past 20-30 years. Growth has slowed, but broadcasting is a
tremendously high free-cash-flow business. . . A television company has 35%-40%
operating margin. You can’t put your money in anything else that gets that kind of return.”
Paige Albiniak, Private Property: Broadcasting moves away from Wall Street,
BROADCASTING
&
CABLE,
Apr.
16,
2007,
available
at
http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/CA6433752.html. Felicity Barringer, Fear of
Cutbacks Rattles Papers In Philadelphia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2000. Also local TV
newsrooms, according to one survey, contribute on average 42 percent to a local television
station’s revenues. Local TV, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20.
38
Independent, publicly traded US newspapers lost 42% of their market value in the
past three years. Eric Alterman, The News Business: Out of Print, NEW YORKER, March
31, 2008, at 48; Newspapers, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20. With the dismantling of
the second largest newspaper chain, Knight-Ridder, and radio giant Clear Channel
Communications going private, another debate is the optimal corporate model for
ownership, whether it be public, privately held, or non-profit trust. Overview, 2007 PEJ
Report, supra note 20. By the end of 2008, approximately 30 U.S. newspapers were still
up for sale. Kenneth Li, Newspaper Asset Sales Draw Few Buyers, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 18
2008. In contrast, stock prices of publicly-traded television owners, as of mid-2007, had
two to three times the growth of the overall stock market. Local TV, in 2008 PEJ Report,
supra note 20.
39
John Morton, It Could Be Worse, AMERICAN JOURNALISM REV., Dec./Jan. 2009,
available at http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4660; Richard Pérez-Peña, At 3 OnceThriving Papers, Prospects Continue to Dim, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/business/media/16paper.html?_r=1&ref=business&pa

TOWARD A BETTER MEDIA POLICY

14

[20-Jan-09

content providers, and HD Radio (multi-channel, multi-format digital radio
services).

The number of media outlets has multiplied.40

With such

technological innovations, consumers often can select the content they
want, when and where they want it, from a variety of sources. Journalism is
no longer passively consumed. Consumers can create news and participate
in the news discourse through citizen publishing, blogging, YouTube and
other developments.41 “Eighty percent of Internet users age 17 and older,”
according to a 2007 study, “consider the Internet to be an important source
of information for them—up from 66 percent in 2006—and higher than
television (68 percent), radio (63 percent), and newspapers (63 percent).”42
And entry barriers are lower with the Internet.
But despite its increasing prominence as a place where people access
news and advertisers spend money, the Internet remains a distribution
medium, not a source of original news content.

Although Internet

companies invest in this medium, the investment has tended to be in
technology and not in journalists. Internet sites unaffiliated with traditional
media typically collect stories from various newspapers and wire services,
gewanted=print.
40
FCC, Report And Order And Order On Reconsideration, in In the Matter of 2006
Quadrennial Regulatory Review – Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership
Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996 et al., Docket Nos. 06-121, 02-277, 01-235, 01-317, 00-244, 04-228, 99-360
(Released Feb. 4, 2008) [hereinafter 2008 FCC Report]. The FCC noted in “absolute terms,
dramatic changes have occurred over several decades with respect to the number and types
of media ‘voices’ competing for the public’s attention.” The FCC noted the “hundreds of
video programming channels available over cable and, later, by satellite distribution,”
approximately 11.6 million subscribers to satellite radio, approximately 86 percent of U.S.
households subscribe to video service provided by an MVPD, which includes cable,
SMATV systems, direct broadcast satellite (DBS), fiberoptic network service, wireless
cable, and other such delivery systems. 2008 FCC Report, supra note 32, at ¶ 24.
41
The number of web sites run by citizen journalists, according to one estimate, is
approaching 1,500. Online, 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20.
42
University of Southern California Press Release, Annual Internet Survey by USC
Annenberg's Center for the Digital Future Finds Shifting Trends Among Adults About the
Benefits and Consequences of Children Going Online (Jan. 17, 2008), available at
http://annenberg.usc.edu/AboutUs/PublicAffairs/AbergNews/080117CDFsurvey.aspx.
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or comment on the news, but do little original local news coverage or
investigative reporting.43

Anecdotes exist of bloggers breaking a news

story, but the available survey data “suggest most Americans have yet to
accept them as significant news sources.”44 The most popular Internet sites
for news remain the domain of the largest media conglomerates.45 Of the
20 most popular online news sites, 17 are owned by one of the 100 largest
media accompanies.46

Time Warner, the leading U.S. media company in

advertising revenues since 1995, for example, controls two (AOL News and
CNN) of the four most popular news websites.47 Moreover, consumers
spend on average 6 minutes online per day reading the news.48 This (as
other studies show) suggests that online news currently complements, rather
than replaces, traditional news media.49
Moreover, it is unclear whether the Internet will be sufficiently
profitable to invest in local investigatory journalism. Approximately 85
percent of all online advertising dollars goes to four Internet sites (Google,
Yahoo, AOL and MSN), and all but one percent goes to the top ten Internet
sites.50

As the recent financial failure of citizen journalism website,

Backfence, reveals, “few of the estimated 500 or so ‘local-local’ news sites
claim to show a profit . . . the overwhelming majority lose money,” and the
43

For example, three of the five most popular news sites on the Web, according to one
2007 study, generated sparse original reporting: both Yahoo and AOL relied on wire
services and other news outlets for 99% and 98%, respectively, of their lead news services.
Google relied exclusively on news wires or other news outlets. Online, 2008 PEJ Report,
supra note 20.
44
Online, 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20.
45
Online, 2007 PEJ Report, supra note 20. The 100 largest media companies (in
terms of 2005 revenues) owned 16 of the top 20 popular online news sites, as ranked by
Nielsen/Net Ratings. Id.
46
Online, 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20.
47
Id.
48
Online, 2007 PEJ Report, supra note 20. In contrast, surveyed consumers spent 30
minutes watching TV news, 15 minutes reading a newspaper, and 16 minutes listening to
news on the radio. Id.
49
Id.
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citizen journalism “business models remain deeply uncertain.”51

One

pessimistic conclusion is that news reporting itself is at risk because of the
shift of audiences and advertisers to the Internet: “the economic base
supporting the most difficult and expensive journalistic undertakings is
eroding.”52
New technologies are bringing dynamic innovations, but the available
evidence still points to the continuing importance of traditional media,
especially newspapers and broadcast television, to the marketplace of ideas.
In the same survey where users identified the Internet’s increased
importance as an information source, “only small numbers of users believe
that the Internet is a catalyst for political change: less than one-quarter of
users (22 percent) believe that the Internet is a tool to encourage public
officials to care more about what people think, while only 28 percent agree
that using the Internet gives people more of a say in what government
does.”53 The workhorse for gathering the news and investigating stories, as
the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) recently found from its
available data, remains the local daily newspaper, followed by the local
television station.54
50

Newspapers and network television, found another

Online, 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20.
Paul Farhi, Rolling the Dice, AJR, June/July 2007 (quoting survey by J-Lab: The
Institute for Interactive Journalism), available at http://www.ajr.org/Article.asp?id=4343.
The citizen journalists surveyed however were quite upbeat: 51% said they didn't need to
make money to keep going; 82% said they planned to continue "indefinitely;" 73% called
their sites a "success," based largely on the impact in their communities; 82% said they
provided opportunities for dialogue; 61% said they watchdogged local government; 39%
said they helped the community solve problems; 27% said they increased voter turnout;
and 17% said they increased the number of candidates running for office. J-Lab: The
Institute for Interactive Journalism, Press Release, CitMedia Sites Are Here to Stay (Feb. 5,
2007), available at http://www.j-lab.org/fordstudy_pr.shtml.
52
Project for Excellence in Journalism, quoted in Baker, supra note 55, at 117.
53
University of Southern California Press Release, Annual Internet Survey by USC
Annenberg's Center for the Digital Future Finds Shifting Trends Among Adults About the
Benefits and Consequences of Children Going Online (Jan. 17, 2008), available at
http://annenberg.usc.edu/AboutUs/PublicAffairs/AbergNews/080117CDFsurvey.aspx.
54
2008 FCC Report, supra note 32, at ¶ 35 (Newspapers and, to a somewhat lesser
51
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recent study, offer a wider variety of subject matter and are less likely to be
dominated by a few mega-stories.55 The Internet may provide readers more
perspectives for international or national news,56 but is not necessarily a
close substitute for the local news in the local daily newspaper and on the
local television news broadcast. Cable provides mainly national news57;
commercial radio covers little local news.
D. The Impact of Media Consolidation
Market failure in media industries poses different and greater concerns
than in other industries. With many commodities, market failure manifests
in higher prices. The consumer pays more.

But market failure in the

marketplace of ideas may not manifest itself simply with higher prices.
Newspapers and other types of information-heavy media are what
economists refer to as “credence goods.”58 Their actual quality is difficult

extent, broadcast stations still continue to serve as the most organized, systematic gatherers
of news and information in their communities). The record before the FCC demonstrated
that “traditional media still represent the most important source for local news for the
majority of individuals.” A Nielsen Survey indicated that 38.2 percent of all respondents
consider broadcast television stations and 30.1 percent consider local newspapers “the most
important source of local news or local current affairs.” Id. at ¶ 57. Thus, the FCC
categorized “major” media voices “full-power commercial and noncommercial television
stations and major newspapers” because “such sources are generally the most important
and relevant outlets for news and information in local markets today.” Id.; Overview, in
2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20.
55
Overview, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20.
56
Online, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20 (based on 2007 study of lead news
coverage on the five most popular news sites on the Web).
57
A study of 885 hours of cable news over 2007 found that cable news focused on
three to four topics per day, and on the news wires and “brief ‘tell stories’” for the balance.
Cable TV, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20. MSNBC spent more time on politics (28%
of time surveyed) than Fox News (15%) or CNN (12%); Fox spent less time on the Iraq
war (10% v. 18% on MNBC and 16% on CNN), and more time on crime, celebrity, and the
media (28% v. 19% on MNBC & 16% on CNN). PEJ calculated that if one watched 5
hours of cable news in 2007, one saw on average: 35 minutes about campaigns and
elections, 36 minutes about the debate over U.S. foreign policy, 26 minutes or more of
crime, 12 minutes of accidents and disasters, 10 minutes of celebrity and entertainment,
and less than 4 minutes about health and health care (3 minutes and 46 seconds); the
economy (3:34), environment (1:25), education (1:22), and science and technology (1:00).
58
See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using The “Consumer Choice” Approach
To Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175, 207 (2007); Michael Darby & Edi Karni, Free
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to determine even after being bought and consumed; it must be taken to
some degree on faith.59

A news channel may claim to be “fair and

balanced” or “the most trusted name in news,” but consumers are illequipped to ascertain the veracity of these assertions regarding specific
stories. Less competition thus may diminish the quality of reporting.60
Another market failure unique to the media is self-censorship.61

If a

Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J. L. & ECON. 67, 68-69 (1973)
(“Credence qualities are those which, although worthwhile, cannot be evaluated in normal
use. Instead the assessment of their value requires additional costly information . . . . The
line between experience and credence qualities of a good may not always be sharp,
particularly if they will be discerned in use, but only after the lapse of a considerable period
of time.”).
59
BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, UNCERTAIN GUARDIANS: THE NEWS MEDIA AS A
POLITICAL INSTITUTION 101-2 (1999).
60
For example, during the presidential campaign, then Senator Obama made extended
critical comments about the current state of U.S. antitrust policy in response to a question
at a campaign stop in Oregon. He stated that he intended, if elected, to enforce the antitrust
laws more strongly and singled out media consolidation as a particular cause for concern.
The Senator’s comments came when there was significant debate about media
consolidation in light of the current FCC’s relaxing of cross-ownership rules and the DOJ’s
approval of the Sirius-XM satellite radio merger. While Senator Obama’s comments
prompted an opinion piece from The Nation and a brief mention in the Financial Times,
none of the 20 prominent newspapers surveyed by the American Antitrust Institute,
independently reported the comments. The Washington Post website and the New York
Times website carried a different Reuters article that covered the reaction of the U.S. legal
community to Senator Obama’s comments on antitrust policy without mentioning Senator
Obama’s concerns of media consolidation. Press Release, American Antitrust Institute
Notes Comments By Senator Obama On Media Concentration: Institute is Critical of Lack
of
Coverage
by
Mainstream
Press
(May 22,
2008),
available
at
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/AAI%20Press%20Release%20Obama%20
Media%20Consolidation%205.22.08_052220081804.pdf. Likewise, as gasoline prices
escalated during the 2008 presidential elections, so too did the debate over drilling in
environmentally sensitive areas. But there was no empirical basis that such drilling would
significantly affect gas prices. Instead, the U.S. Department of Energy projected that such
drilling (which was estimated to add 200,000 barrels of oil per day at peak productions in
20 years) would be too small to significantly affect oil prices. Of the surveyed 267
television and cable news broadcasts in the summer of 2008 that mentioned the proposed
drilling, however, only one broadcast mentioned this governmental study. Instead, as one
study found, the major “media outlets provided daily repetition of the false claim that
expanded drilling in environmentally sensitive zones would significantly lower gasoline
prices.” Mark Weisbrot & Nichole Szembrot, Center for Economic & Policy Research
Issue Brief: Oil Drilling in Environmentally Sensitive Areas: The Role of the Media 4
(Sept. 2008).
61
See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 9; BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (6th ed.
2000); ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION
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concentrated media industry is dependent upon major advertisers or
government funding,62 the risk of self-censorship increases.63

Both

advertisers and politicians may seek to take advantage of this selfcensorship for their own purposes. A case in point is the reported attempt
by Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich to induce the owner of the Chicago
Tribune to fire members of the newspaper’s editorial board who had been
calling for the Governor’s impeachment. The Tribune Company had been
POLITICS IN DUBIOUS TIMES 243 (1999); Statement of FCC Commissioner Michael J.
Copps, Concurs and Dissents in Part in Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the
Broadcasting Services et al., MB Docket Nos. 07-294, 06-121, 02-277, 01-235, 01-317, 00244, and 04-228 (Dec. 18, 2007) (Commissioner heard “first-hand from editorial page
editors who have told me they can cover any story, save one—media consolidation, and
that they have been instructed to stay away from that one.”). Journalists and media
watchdogs have also expressed concern about the rise of self-censorship and the loss of
journalistic independence following the increasing media concentration. See, e.g., Trudy
Lieberman, You Can’t Report What You Don’t Pursue, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV.,
May/June 2000, at 44, 44−49; Mark Crispin Miller, Can Viacom’s Reporters Cover
Viacom’s Interests?, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Nov./Dec. 1999, at 50, 50. In enacting the
1992 Cable Act, Congress noted its “special concerns” about concentration of the media in
the hands of a few who may control the dissemination of information. One concern was
that “the media gatekeepers will (1) slant information according to their own biases, or
(2) provide no outlet for unorthodox or unpopular speech because it does not sell well, or
both.” Congress’s second concern about “horizontal concentration is that it can be the basis
of anticompetitive acts. For example, a market that is dominated by one buyer of a product,
a monopsonist, does not give the seller any of the benefits of competition.” S. Rep. No.
102–92, at 32–33 (1991), as reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1165–66. Congress sought to
remedy these concerns in the 1992 Cable Act, with several provisions including the “mustcarry,” “subscriber limits” and “channel occupancy” provisions.
62
See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS
FOR
MARKETS
188
(2002),
available
at
http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/2001/fulltext/fulltext2002.htm.
63
In a survey of journalists, editors, and news executives in the U.S., “more than onethird responded that news is not reported if it might hurt advertising revenues and thus
harm the financial position of media firms.” WORLD BANK, supra note 62, at 188. If the
advertisers consolidate (such as department stores), this lessening of competition can also
adversely affect media dependent on these advertisers (such as daily newspapers which
relied on Macy’s, Bloomingdales, Lord & Taylor, among others for advertising). The
extent to which consolidation has adversely impacted newspapers overall is not evident
from NAA data on newspaper revenues for retail and national advertising.
http://www.naa.org/TrendsandNumbers/Advertising-Expenditures.aspx (last visited May
23, 2008). Although the failure of liberal talk show Air America had many causes, it is
interesting that according to an ABC Radio Network memo, that 90 prominent advertisers,
including Hewlett-Packard, Microsoft, Wal-Mart, Visa, Exxon-Mobil, Cingular and
McDonalds, did not want their advertising running during any syndicated Air America
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seeking state financial assistance as part of its effort to sell the Chicago
Cubs; the Governor allegedly threatened to withhold that assistance unless
changes were made to the composition of editorial board. According to an
intercepted telephone conversation, the Governor’s chief of staff reported to
his boss that the owner of the Tribune “got the message.”64 Increased
competition in the news market, on the other hand, can lead to lower bias.65
The Internet today cannot prevent these media market failures.
Commercial radio, instead of a good example for permitting greater
consolidation, may be an example of its dangers. The Telecommunications
Act of 1996 weakened the ownership limits on radio stations nationally and
locally.66

In analyzing radio mergers, the U.S. Department of Justice

(“DOJ”) considered their economic impact solely on advertisers and the
rates they pay for advertising.67 In its public filings, the DOJ did not refer

programming the ABC stations carried. Radio, in 2007 PEJ Report, supra note 20.
64
Illinois Gov. Rod R. Blagojevich and his Chief of Staff John Harris Arrested on
Federal Corruption Charges, U.S. Dept. of Justice Press Release 9-12 (Dec. 9, 2008),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2008/pr1209_01.pdf; see also
Affidavit in Support of Application for Criminal Complaint, United States v. Rod R.
Blagojevich
(N.D.
Ill.
Dec.
7,
2008),
¶¶
69-85,
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2008/pr1209_01a.pdf.
65
Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Media Bias & Reputation, 114 J. POL.
ECON. 280 (2006). The authors found that in high feedback settings (such as weather or
sports reporting), bias is minimal. In slow feedback settings, competition impacts bias.
Media firms in more competitive markets have stronger incentives to reveal important
information; the authors show quantitatively that television news reports leading up to the
2000 elections were more equitable in their treatment of Bush and Gore in more
competitive media markets. This finding was consistent with several other studies that
show how competition among alternative sources of media reduces bias. Id. at 309.
66
Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 abolished the FCC’s limits on
the number of radio stations a single entity could own nationally. On March 7, 1996, the
FCC in revising Section 73.3555 of its Rules (47 C.F.R. § 73.3555) eliminated the national
multiple radio ownership rule and relaxed the local ownership rule. GEORGE WILLIAMS,
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REVIEW OF THE RADIO INDUSTRY 1 2007,
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-07-3470A11.pdf.
67
Although a number of possible product markets exist (such as listenership and
programming), the DOJ focused in its radio consent decrees on the mergers’ impact on
advertisers and advertising rates as evaluated under the U.S. Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines (1997), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
¶13,104, available at http://usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmg1.html
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to other possible markets such as programming markets or listenership
markets or consider consumer choice.
Significant ownership concentration ensued. Between March 1996
and March 2007, the number of commercial radio stations increased 6.8
percent, but the number of radio owners declined by 39 percent.68 Over the
[Horizontal Merger Guidelines]. The consent decrees acknowledge that radio stations also
compete on advertising services-for example, by offering live remote broadcasts from an
advertiser's place of business-but this tends to be a value-added feature and is not the
primary focus of the relief obtained. See, e.g., Competitive Impact Statement, U.S. v. Bain
Capital LLC, 1:08-cv-00245 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 13, 2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f230100/230166.htm; Complaint for Injunctive Relief, U.S.
v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc. and AMFM Inc., No. 00-2063 (D.D.C. filed Aug.
29, 2000) (complaint filed with consent decree), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f6300/6329.htm; U.S. v. CBS Corp., No. 98CV00819, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10292, at *1 (D.D.C. Jun. 30, 1998) (proposed decree requiring divestiture of
radio stations to cure anticompetitive effect in radio advertising market).; U.S. v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., No. 96 2563, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3263, at *8 (D.D.C. Mar.
10, 1997) (same). Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines’ approach, whether radio
advertising is a relevant product market is based in part on advertisers’ likely response to a
“small but significant and nontransitory increase” in the advertising rates of the merging
radio stations. Some of the antitrust product market questions addressed in the radio
merger consent decrees are (i) would large numbers of advertisers shift to other media, (ii)
are there attributes of radio advertising that make other media poor substitutes to many
advertisers, and (iii) can stations identify advertisers with strong radio preferences and
selectively raise prices? Similarly, in assessing competitive effects, the DOJ inquires
whether advertisers will end up paying more or getting less after a radio merger. Some of
the issues addressed in these consent decrees are (i) have advertisers lost the ability to play
one of the merging company's radio stations off against the other company's stations to get
better advertising rates, (ii) can advertisers buy around the merged entity to reach a
particular audience demographic, and (iii) after the merger, can advertisers reach their
target audience with equivalent efficiency without using the merged company's radio
stations? The DOJ’s radio merger consent decrees do not address nonprice competition
unrelated to advertising, including the quality of programming, listener choice, or the likely
impact of these mergers on the marketplace of ideas.
68
GEORGE WILLIAMS, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REVIEW OF THE
RADIO
INDUSTRY,
2007,
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-07-3470A11.pdf. This trend was
already apparent by 2001, by which the number of radio owners had already declined 25%.
FCC REVIEW OF THE RADIO INDUSTRY 2001 2 (Sept. 2001). Likewise, the number of fullpower television stations increased (from 875 in 1970 to 1,754 in 2006). Kiran Duwadi,
Scott Roberts, and Andrew Wise, Media Ownership Study Two: Ownership Structure and
Robustness of Media, available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA07-3470A3.pdf. But the number of unique television owners decreased (from 491 to 480 in
2005). Letter from JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues, Government
Accountability Office, to The Honorable Edward J. Markey, Chairman, Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and the Internet, House Committee on Energy and Commerce 5 (Dec.
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same period, the size of the nation’s largest radio group owners increased.
In 1996, the two largest radio group owners controlled 62 and 53 stations,
respectively.

By March 2007, the leading radio group, Clear Channel

Communications, controlled over 1,100 radio stations.69 One complaint,
reported by the Project for Excellence in Journalism, was “that Clear
Channel’s domination was diminishing the quality of the AM/FM radio dial
by monopolizing key markets and homogenizing content.”70 The former
head of commercial radio Infinity Broadcasting and CBS and current CEO
of Sirius XM recognized that commercial radio after the 1996 Act became
“totally homogenized.” Mel Karmazin advocated the radio consolidation
“[s]trictly for business reasons. No one asked me if it was good for
consumers.”71
The ownership concentration in radio was felt on the local level.72
The number of local cross-ownerships between radio and television stations
14, 2007) available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08330r.pdf. The number of
newspapers remained about the same between 2002 and 2005, but the number of
newspaper owners declined from 422 to 389.
69
In 2008, the Clear Channel controlled 833 U.S. radio stations, 508 of which are
located in the largest 100 Arbitron markets. Competitive Impact Statement, United States
v. Bain Capital LLC, 1:08-cv-00245 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 13, 2008), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f230100/230166.htm.
70
Radio, in 2007 PEJ Report, supra note 20. Critics have also complained that it
exerted a negative effect on American radio. Clear Channel as reported also
popularised voice-tracking, whereby segments of speech, music and
commercials were sent digitally from one Clear Channel network to another.
These were then cut and pasted into the radio programmes, giving the listener the
impression that, for example, a DJ was taking a live request or was doing an
interview when, in fact, they were not. Clear Channel argued that this technique
allows it to deliver national DJ talent to local markets that could not otherwise
afford it. It also cuts costs.
Clear Channel agrees $18.7bn sale, BBC News, Nov. 16, 2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6155284.stm (last visited May 23, 2008).
71
Phil Rosenthal, Homogenized Radio Stations Bottle Up Growth, CHICAGO TRIB.,
Nov. 11, 2007, at http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2007/nov/11/business/chisun_phil_1111nov11.
72
The average number of radio station owners across all metro markets declined from
13.5 in 1996 to 9.4 in 2007. GEORGE WILLIAMS, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, REVIEW OF THE RADIO INDUSTRY, 2007, available at
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increased.73 One empirical study relied upon by the FCC showed that the
amount of news for these cross-ownership stations was consistently less
than their peers: “the average effect of radio cross-ownership on local news
coverage is consistently negative,” i.e., less news.74 Not only were local
radio markets more concentrated, but a few radio firms dominated local
advertising. On the local level, the largest firm in each radio metro market
has, on average, 46 percent of the market’s total radio advertising revenue;
the largest two firms have, on average, 74 percent of the radio advertising
revenue.75 Although radio listening declined since 1998, radio advertising
rates since 1996 have nearly doubled, suggesting that even on this
dimension, the antitrust review may have been inadequate. As one recent
FCC study concluded, the Consumer Price Index “increased approximately
3 percent per year during this time period, while the annual growth rate in
radio prices was approximately 10 percent.”76
The claim was frequently made in the 1990s that consolidation would
allow radio owners to offer a more diverse array of formats.77 But it is not
evident that increased radio ownership concentration has led to greater
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-07-3470A11.pdf.
73
The number of TV/radio station cross-ownerships in the same market increased from
273 television/656 radio stations in 2002 to 333 television/782 radio stations in 2005. Kiran
Duwadi, Scott Roberts, & Andrew Wise, Media Ownership Study Two: Ownership
Structure
and
Robustness
of
Media,
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-07-3470A3.pdf.
74
Jeffrey Milyo, The Effects of Cross-Ownership on the Local Content and Political
Slant of Local Television News 21 (Rev. Sept. 2007), available at
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/studies.html. The FCC relied upon this study as evidence of
how newspapers can spread their fixed costs over other media to increase news content,
which is discussed infra note __.
75
GEORGE WILLIAMS, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REVIEW OF THE
RADIO
INDUSTRY
2007,,
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-07-3470A11.pdf.
76
The CPI increased 29 percent during the same period. GEORGE WILLIAMS, FEDERAL
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REVIEW OF THE RADIO INDUSTRY, 2007, available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-07-3470A11.pdf.
77
See, e.g., Matt Spangler, Can’t Find Nothin’ on Radio?, R&R (July 31, 1998),
available at http://www.radiodiversity.com/nothingonradio.html.
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program diversity. According to one FCC study, between 1996 and 2007,
the average number of formats appears to have declined slightly for some of
the large markets, while increasing slightly for most of the smaller ones.
Overall, the variety of radio formats available to consumers has held
steady.78
The traditional deregulatory, anti-interventionist argument is that the
free market will adjust to match viewer preferences, so that ownership does
not matter. But in a study of FCC data, several consumer groups claim that
less news is broadcast in cities where companies have been granted waivers
to the FCC cross-ownership rules to allow them to own both newspapers
and broadcasters, although the evidence is equivocal.79
78

GEORGE WILLIAMS, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, REVIEW OF THE
RADIO
INDUSTRY,
2007,
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-07-3470A11.pdf.
79
See Further Comments of Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America and
Free
Press
(Oct.
27,
2007),
at
6-8,
86-109,
available
at
http://stopbigmedia.com/filing/critique_complete.pdf. The FCC noted that the empirical
evidence in the record supported “both sides” concerning the relationship between
newspaper/broadcast combinations and localism. The FCC concluded that on balance, the
evidence “suggests” that “some” newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership combinations could
enhance localism. 2008 FCC Report, supra note 32, at ¶ 42. The FCC relied in particular
on one study of 29 cross-owned television stations in 27 markets, which concluded that
“local television newscasts for cross-owned stations contain on average about 1-2 minutes
more news coverage overall, or 4 to 8 percent more than the average for non-cross-owned
stations.” Jeffrey Milyo, The Effects of Cross-Ownership on the Local Content and
Political Slant of Local Television News (Rev. Sept. 2007) (“Media Ownership Study No.
6”), available at http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/studies.html. The study’s author, however,
recognized several important caveats. First, the study’s sample was small: time and
resource constraints limited him to “only three days during the week prior to the 2006
general elections on Tuesday, November 7th.” Media Ownership Study No. 6, at 8. His
second important caveat to his study is that these 3 days may not be representative for the
remainder of the year: “the behavior of local news stations may not be the same during the
week just prior to the general elections compared to other times of the year” so “the
findings of this study may not be representative of differences in local news coverage by
cross-ownership throughout the rest of the year.” Id. at 9. A third important caveat is that
he looked only at late-evening local news, which may not represent a station’s daily news
coverage. A fourth caveat is that his analysis “cannot determine whether local television
stations (cross-owned or not) present news in a balanced or biased manner.” Id. at 30.
Some of the author’s findings were surprising nonetheless given the upcoming elections.
Local stations broadcast approximately 26 minutes of total news coverage, with about 80%
of this time devoted to local stories. But actual “local news, excluding sports and weather,
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The debate concerns not only the quantity of independent media
owners, but the extent to which programming is affected when a radio or
television station is owned by a large out-of-market station group as
opposed to a local independent owner.80 There is some evidence that large
public companies tend to sacrifice journalistic quality in pursuit of the
bottom line. Good journalism is expensive, and yields social benefits that
are not captured in the balance sheet. In a large study in 2003, the Project
for Excellence in Journalism ranked television news programs from best to
worst and divided stations into groups based on the size of the owner.81 PEJ
found the news programs of the smallest owners to be 30 percent high
quality, compared with 12 percent for the largest owners. Likewise, the
smallest owners had 17 percent news programs graded as low quality,
compared to 23 percent of the largest owners. In general, as ownership size

accounts for a little less than half (46%) of the total news time. Finally, state and local
political coverage averages just about three minutes per newscast for the dates under
study.” Id. at 16. The amount of incremental news coverage from cross-owned televisions
stations was only “about 21 seconds.” Id. One FCC-sponsored peer review of this study
concluded that given these caveats, “the empirical data in the study are so limited that the
study’s conclusions do not and cannot possess the reasonable level of confidence necessary
to provide policymakers with useful evidence on which to base their regulatory decisions.
Put simply, the findings from a single three-day study of one type of news broadcast should
not form the evidentiary basis for any sort of public policy making.” Kenneth Goldstein,
Matthew Hale and Martin Kaplan, Invited Peer Review of FCC Media Ownership Study 6,
MB
Docket
No.
06-121
(Oct.
30,
2007),
available
at
http://www.fcc.gov/mb/peer_review/prstudy6a.pdf.
80
As of 2005, a minority of the newspapers and commercial radio and television
stations were locally owned: 210 of the nation’s 1381 commercial television stations,
4,827 of the 10,893 nation’s commercial radio stations, 444 of the nation’s 1445
newspapers. In contrast, the majority of non-commercial radio and television stations were
locally owned: 1671 of 2697 non-commercial radio stations and 229 of the 383 noncommercial television stations. Kiran Duwadi, Scott Roberts, and Andrew Wise, Media
Ownership Study Two: Ownership Structure and Robustness of Media, available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-07-3470A3.pdf.
81
To examine size, the authors separated the TV companies studied into four
categories, using the FCC rankings of audience reach. Their measurement of audience
reach followed the FCC’s policy of discounting for the difference between the reach of
UHF versus VHF stations.
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increased, news quality decreased.82 On the other hand, the study also
found that a television station’s cross-ownership of a newspaper led to
better grades. Stations in cross-ownership situations were more than twice
as likely to receive an “A” grade as were other stations.83
The FCC, during the Bush administration, allegedly ordered its staff to
destroy all copies of a draft study that suggested greater media
concentration would hurt local television news.

Based on a review of

10,500 clips from local news programs broadcast in twenty markets, two
FCC economists found that locally-owned television stations produced
more local news—about five and one-half minutes more local news per
half-hour program—than non-locally-owned stations.84 The study’s finding
was said to have been at odds with the FCC, which was reportedly facing
pressure from the broadcast industry to conclude that media ownership rules
were too restrictive and should be loosened.

In a meeting with their

supervisor, the FCC economists were allegedly told, “the front office wasn’t
going to let it out, and the bureau chief wasn’t going to let it out.”85
82

PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN JOURNALISM, DOES OWNERSHIP MATTER IN LOCAL
TELEVISION NEWS? A FIVE-YEAR STUDY OF OWNERSHIP AND QUALITY 2003, available at
(http://www.journalism.org/node/243. In analyzing content across local markets, James
Hamilton similarly found that group-owned television stations carried fewer hard news
stories, network affiliates did more stories in their local news programs about the network’s
entertainment programming, and that papers owned by chains covered a higher percentage
of soft news topics. JAMES T. HAMILTON, ALL THE NEWS THAT’S FIT TO SELL 249 (2004).
83
The study’s authors, like the FCC in liberalizing the cross-ownership ban, thought
that cross-ownership suggested that the joint resources of a newspaper and TV station freed
up people to do more original work. But as their study revealed, the cross-owned stations
actually scored lower on the enterprise index in general, and particularly in the area of
sending out reporters to cover stories: “the generalized sign of higher quality at crossowned stations, for some reason, did not include those stations doing more enterprise.” Id.
84
See John Dunbar, FCC Quashed Contrary Reports: Research Supported Notion that
Local Ownership of TV Stations Strengthened News, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Jan. 26,
2007, at A4.
85
Id. Another reportedly suppressed FCC radio study indicated that over seven years
there had been a 35% decline in the number of radio station owners, and that 70% of
advertising revenue in markets that were examined was controlled by two firms. The
Senate, during its confirmation hearings, questioned the incoming FCC chairman about this
self-censorship, and the FCC thereafter posted drafts of the local news study and a copy of
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E. Impact on Women and Minority Ownership of Media
As then-Senator Obama recognized, “[m]inority-owned radio stations,
television stations and newspapers played an essential role in battling
segregation during the civil rights movement.”86 One of the starkest effects
of consolidation in the radio and television industries has been its effect on
minority and women ownership.
In broadcast radio, a study done by Free Press found that the
percentage of women and minority radio station owners was lower in highly
concentrated radio markets than in less concentrated markets. The less
concentrated markets also tend to be the larger markets, where FCC
ownership rules have limited to some extent the opportunities for
consolidation. However, even if the size of the market and the level of
minority population in the market are held constant, the study found that
markets with minority owners are significantly less concentrated than
markets without minority owners.

A similar examination of female

ownership shows that markets with a female-owned radio station are
significantly less concentrated than markets without such stations. The Free
Press study concluded: “One unambiguous consequence of further industry
consolidation and concentration will be to diminish both the number of
minority-owned stations and the number of female-owned stations. The
FCC should seriously consider the effects on women and minority owners
and their listeners before it moves to enact policies that will lead to
increased market concentration.”87
A similar trend has been seen in other media.

A recent FCC-

sponsored study on the impact of the relaxation of the television duopoly

the radio study.
86
Obama & Kerry, supra note 2.
87
Off The Dial: Female and Minority Radio Station Ownership in the United States
(June 2007), http://www.freepress.net/docs/off_the_dial.pdf.
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rule found that the major beneficiaries were the largest 25 television
groups.88 The losers were minorities and women. The study found that the
percentage of minority and women owners declined significantly after the
rule was relaxed in 1999. The specific findings were as follows:


Across all markets in which minority-owned television stations
operated between 1999 and 2006, the number of minority-owned
television stations dropped by 27 percent.



Minority owners were roughly three times more likely to leave a
market than to enter it.



Thirty-nine percent of minority owned stations in TV duopoly
markets were sold to non-minority owners.



Thirty-six percent of female-owned stations operating in duopoly
markets were sold to male, non-minority owners.

Consequently, as the FCC-sponsored study concluded, the relaxation of the
television duopoly rule benefited neither women nor minority owners.
Relaxation of the FCC ownership limits has tended to drive up
valuations of stations, pricing potential purchasers (small businesses and
broadcasters including minorities and women entrepreneurs and owners)
out of the market. The rise in station prices may have benefited owners of
existing stations by allowing them to sell out at higher prices. It may
thereby have benefited a class of minority or women owners–the sellers–but
it did not benefit the goal of preserving or increasing minority ownership or
88

The Impact of the FCC’s TV Duopoly Rule Relaxation on Minority and Women
Owned
Broadcast
Stations
1999-2006,
available
at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-07-3470A9.pdf. The GAO found
the FCC data on the gender, race, and ethnicity of radio and television station owners
biennially through its Ownership Report for Commercial Broadcast Stations, or Form 323
“suffer from three weaknesses: (1) exemptions from filing for certain types of broadcast
stations, such as noncommercial stations; (2) inadequate data quality procedures; and (3)
problems with data storage and retrieval.” The GAO concluded from the available
evidence from FCC and nongovernmental reports that ownership of broadcast outlets by
these groups is “limited.” GAO, supra note 68, at 3.
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ownership by women. “Racial and ethnic minorities make up 33 percent of
our population,” said FCC Commissioner Copps, but they “own a scant 3
percent of all full-power commercial TV stations.”89

As FCC

Commissioner Adelstein added, “When it comes to ensuring that the
ownership of the public’s airways—which are licensed to serve the
public—look like the American people, the FCC’s legacy does not make us
proud.”90
The decrease in minority and women owners can also affect the news
content in that community.

Professor Joel Waldfogel argues that in

industries with high fixed costs like broadcasting or newspapers, the market
tends to favor the tastes of the majority over “preference minorities.” When
fixed costs are high, a market can accommodate relatively fewer products
than when fixed costs are low. Not only are these products more likely to
target large rather than small groups, the relative size of the large group to
the small group can actually make the smaller group less well off in terms
of product targeting. Media markets are more similar to “winner takes all”
political markets than is generally supposed.91 Professor Waldfogel uses
the example of radio programming to show that formats that appeal to a
particular group will not be offered unless that group is relatively large.
The same is true with newspapers in the sense of how they position
themselves. In other words, the market does not ensure that everyone goes
home happy: “. . . I don’t get the sort of newspaper that I want just because
89

Statement of FCC Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Concurs and Dissents in Part in
Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcasting Services et al., MB Docket
Nos. 07-294, 06-121, 02-277, 01-235, 01-317, 00-244, and 04-228 (Dec. 18, 2007).
90
Statement of FCC Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein, Concurs and Dissents in
Part in Promoting Diversification of Ownership in the Broadcasting Services et al., MB
Docket Nos. 07-294, 06-121, 02-277, 01-235, 01-317, 00-244, and 04-228 (Dec. 18, 2007).
91
“In spite of the liberation rhetoric often used to describe the market, the same kinds
of groups disadvantaged by majority rule – small groups with different preferences – can
find themselves at a disadvantage in product markets as well. This raises a challenge to the
common exhortation ‘let the market decide.’” JOEL WALDFOGEL, THE TYRANNY OF THE
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I want it. I get what I want if many other people also want it. Second, a
larger population preferring something else actually makes me worse off,
thereby failing to avoid strains on social cohesion; this evidence stands in
stark contrast with many idealized portraits of markets.”92
Professor Waldfogel takes the analysis a step further, showing that the
presence or absence of minority-targeted local media has a measurable
effect on voting turnout. The presence of Spanish-language local television
news raises Hispanic turnout from an average of 31 percent to about 40
percent in nonpresidential election years, or by about a third. In presidential
years, the presence of Spanish-language local television news raises
Hispanic turnout by about a sixth. “These are large effects,” Professor
Waldfogel concludes.93 In addition, he finds that the entry of a Spanish
language local television news program results in an overall increase in
Hispanic turnout by about 5 percentage points.

Similarly, African-

American voter turnout is about 10-15 percent higher in areas with a weekly
newspaper or a radio station specifically targeted to African Americans. In
addition, African-American voter turnout increases by a dramatic
percentage in metropolitan areas that get a first radio station targeted to
African Americans.
III. CALLS FOR LIBERALIZATION TO PROTECT TRADITIONAL MEDIA
With traditional media in flux and the growth of new media, some argue
that antitrust should have a limited role in this industry and the FCC should
ease restrictions on media ownership. We discuss in this Part whether the
Obama administration should permit greater consolidation in the media
industry. After critiquing the FCC’s justification in 2008 to relax media
cross-ownership restrictions, we show why the number of media sources in
MARKET 6 (2007).
92
Waldfogel, supra note 91, at 57.
93
Waldfogel, supra note 91, at 82.
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a given community (or nationwide) may be a poor indicator of the
marketplace’s competitiveness.
A. Moving Beyond a Laissez-Faire Attitude
Before the economic crisis, the Bush administration generally had great
faith that free market forces correct market failures, and little faith in
government institutions promoting competition.94

Even before our

economy’s unraveling, this view of markets generally, and media markets
specifically, was empirically suspect.95 In understanding these issues, the
Obama administration cannot blindly rely on neo-classical economic
theory’s simplistic assumptions about human behavior or efficient

94

Until the economic crisis (with mounting unemployment and home foreclosures,
declining stock prices, and the United States’ bailing out financial, insurance and
automotive companies deemed too big to fail), the Bush administration generally surmised
that: (1) free market forces are generally self-correcting and self-initiating, (2) absent
governmental restraints, the free market will allocate resources efficiently, (3) the
government is an exogenous force to be used sparingly for sustained market failure, (4) the
government can do more harm than good, so the risk of false positives is greater than of
false negatives, and (5) government bureaucrats are so susceptible to regulatory capture
that the goals of competition policy, once inoculated from politics, will be value-free
efficiency and consumer welfare. Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, supra note 13.
The federal antitrust agencies similarly had a hands-off approach, with a few exceptions, to
the media industries. But in his last weeks, the FCC Chair reflected on the nation’s
economic crisis:
My philosophy throughout my time at the FCC including the last four years as
chairman has been to pursue deregulation while paying close attention to its
impact on consumers and the particulars of a given market; to balance
deregulation with consumer protection. . . . We must also be creative and flexible
in our approach making sure government is working for consumers. Most of that
time that means getting out of the way. But sometimes we must recognize that
there is a unique role only government can play. In order to have credibility
calling for deregulation we must be willing to act in a targeted limited fashion
when the market isn’t properly working is important for another reason as well.
As the current financial crisis has reminded us problems don’t disappear if they
are simply ignored. They can become bigger problems requiring the government
to intervene in a larger way later.
Remarks by FCC Chairman Kevin J. Martin, Balancing Deregulation and Consumer
Protection, The Reg-Markets Center Of The American Enterprise Institute (Jan. 8, 2009),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-287777A1.doc.
95
See Stucke, Better Competition Advocacy, supra note 13, at 1009-12.
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markets.96 The purpose and benefits of a competitive marketplace of ideas
differentiate media markets from other markets.
Ideally, the federal competition agencies in the Obama administration
should do or sponsor more empirical work to understand better the
competitive dynamics of media industries and how they differ from other
industries. More empirical work is necessary—in particular, work that goes
beyond advertising markets and includes nonprice competition. Currently,
the FCC, under the 1996 Act, must justify empirically in its biennial review
its existing ownership regulations. If the FCC cannot readily supply this
empirical evidence, the courts have construed the 1996 Act as requiring the
FCC to further deregulate.97 Given the empirical difficulties in testing the
correlation between media consolidation and viewpoint diversity, the
current default standard effectively favors further media deregulation. We
urge that before any further deregulation is undertaken, the Obama
administration should study or sponsor studies of the effects of media
consolidation to date.
B. Should We Allow More Newspapers and Television Stations to Merge?
The FCC in 2008 voted to relax media cross-ownership restrictions.98
96

See Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the TwentyFirst Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 521 (2007) (discussing the intersection of antitrust
and behavioral economics); Maurice E. Stucke, New Antitrust Realism, GCP (Global
Competition Policy) MAGAZINE, Jan. 2009, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1323815.
97
Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Viewpoint Diversity and Media Consolidation: An
Empirical Study, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121229.
98
The vote was three to two along party lines. The FCC adopted a presumption, in the
top 20 Designated Market Areas (“DMAs”), that it is consistent with the public interest for
one entity to own a daily newspaper and a radio station or, under the following
circumstances, a daily newspaper and a television station, if (1) the television station is not
ranked among the top four stations in the DMA and (2) at least eight independent “major
media voices” remain in the DMA. In all other instances, the FCC will adopt a presumption
that a newspaper/broadcast station combination would not be in the public interest, with
two exceptions, and therefore emphasize that the FCC is unlikely to approve such
transactions. Taking into account these respective presumptions, in determining whether
the grant of a transaction that would result in newspaper/broadcast cross-ownership is in
the public interest, the FCC will consider: (1) whether the cross-ownership will increase the
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Then-FCC Chair Kevin Martin’s proposal to loosen the newspaperbroadcast cross-ownership ban in the top 20 cities was more limited than his
predecessor’s attempt at wholesale transformation of the media ownership
rules. Nonetheless, opposition was not long in coming. The U.S. Senate
expressed its displeasure through a “resolution of disapproval,”99 and the
incoming FCC chair is believed to oppose the weakening of the crossownership rules.100 Among other things, critics argued that Chairman
Martin’s proposal had a loophole that would allow cross-ownership in
smaller markets, not just in the 20 largest markets.
The FCC’s rationale for allowing owners of certain newspapers and
television stations in the same market to merge is based on efficiencies: the
merger will enable the owners to spread their high fixed costs for obtaining
news over a greater audience. Thereby, the newspaper/television owner
will have greater incentive to produce more news.101

The FCC’s key

assumption is that cross-ownership in “the largest markets can preserve the
viability of newspapers without threatening diversity by allowing them to
spread their operational costs across multiple platforms” and newspapers
“can improve or increase the news offered by the broadcaster and the

amount of local news disseminated through the affected media outlets in the combination;
(2) whether each affected media outlet in the combination will exercise its own
independent news judgment; (3) the level of concentration in the Nielsen DMA; and (4) the
financial condition of the newspaper or broadcast outlet, and if the newspaper or broadcast
station is in financial distress, the proposed owner’s commitment to invest significantly in
newsroom operations. The FCC discussed the need to support the availability and
sustainability of local news while not significantly increasing local concentration or
harming diversity. 2008 FCC Report, supra note 32, at Appendix A.
99
John Dunbar, Senate Votes To Roll Back Media Ownership Rule, WASH. POST, May
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp16,
2008,
available
at
dyn/content/article/2008/05/16/AR2008051601386.html.
100
Editorial: Media Ownership Rules Safe In FCC Nominee Julius Genachowski's
Hands,
SEATTLE
TIMES,
Jan.
15,
2009,
available
at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/editorialsopinion/2008633309_edita16fccboss.html.
101
2008 FCC Report, supra note 32, at ¶ 35.
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restrictions to protect newspapers: “The newspaper industry has faced
significant challenges recently and I feel we have to do all we can to ensure
we continue to have a vibrant industry.”103
Opponents have questioned whether the FCC should worry about
newspapers’ financial health since newspapers are generally outside the
scope of the agency’s expertise. Another question is whether the case has
been made that the newspaper industry actually needs or would benefit from
this particular type of regulatory relief. It is worth recalling that in 2000,
The New York Times Co. Chairman Arthur Sulzberger Jr. said, “From a
business perspective, we will not achieve the financial success that can be
ours without entering the world of television.”104 Seven years later, the
Times sold its nine TV stations, and left its partnership with Discovery
Communications on a joint TV channel.105 What changed? Apparently, the
expected synergies never materialized. Moreover, newspapers, including
the NEW YORK TIMES, discovered that it was cheaper to shoot digital video
of a news event and post it on the newspaper’s own website. This low cost
video has proven to be popular with both viewers and advertisers.106
Besides,

less

restrictive

newspaper/television station merger.

alternatives

exist

to

a

full

Content-sharing arrangements are

already in place in many markets, although apparently not in the very
102

Id., at ¶ 24.
Stephen Labaton, Few Friends for Proposal on Media, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007.
The industry trade association, Newspaper Association of America, however, complained
that that the FCC’s three Republican Commissioners did not go far enough in relaxing the
cross-ownership ban. Id.
104
Frank Ahrens, Newspaper-TV Marriage Shows Signs of Strain, WASH. POST, Jan.
11, 2007, at D01.
105
Id.
106
Id. Also two other companies announced splitting their assets. Belo will spin off
its newspapers from its local television business. E.W. Scripps will spin off from its
newspaper and local television assets its cable networks including HGTV into a new
company. Newspapers, in 2008 PEJ Report, supra note 20.
103
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largest markets.107 Newspapers can and do collaborate with local television
networks to promote their news content in ways that do not involve a full
merger.
Finally, even if a newspaper/television station combination yields
some efficiencies, one must ask: at what price? The inherent inefficiency
of the marketplace of ideas sets it apart from mergers of ordinary
commodities.

In industries with high fixed costs and homogeneous

products, a merger may enable firms to achieve economies of scale by
rationalizing production lines. The machines run for longer periods, with
greater output.

Consumers in these industries may not desire product

variety, so this loss of diversity is insignificant. But in the marketplace of
ideas, a premium is placed on diversity of ideas.108 Indeed, a concern with
cost-savings efficiencies may point in the wrong direction when other
values are at stake.109 Cost-savings efficiencies may be beneficial when
they yield greater output of better quality programming. But cost-savings
alone are not dispositive: many competing independent news sources may
confer a greater benefit to society than an efficient monopolist that produces
a homogenous news product.110
107

Consequently, when cost-saving

The GAO’s recent survey of several media markets found agreements among
stations to share content or agreements that allow one company to produce programming or
sell advertising through two outlets. These agreements, “were prevalent in a variety of
markets but not in the top three markets, suggesting that market size may influence the
benefits that companies realize through such agreements.” GAO, supra note 68, at 2.
108
While the newspaper venture may be more efficient, the marketplace of ideas
would be diminished. See, e.g., Paddock Publ’ns, Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d
42, 45 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[a] market in which every newspaper carried the same stories,
columns, and cartoons would be a less vigorous market than the existing one”).
109
As the former FTC Chairman noted, “an occasional loss of efficiency as a result of
antitrust enforcement can be tolerated and is to be expected if antitrust is to serve other
legitimate values.” Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
1051, 1074 (1979). See also Baker, supra note 9, at 43-44.
110
It might be very efficient if all the newspapers combined their news collection
operations into one operation. News collection generally has high fixed costs. To report a
story may cost the same if you have one reader or a million readers. This cost is reduced
with each additional newspaper that is sold or read. Under one operation, the newspapers
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efficiencies are claimed in media mergers, the Obama administration should
recognize the tension between cost-savings efficiencies arising from
product homogenization, on the one hand, and a media policy seeking
greater diversity in the marketplace of ideas.
C. Number of Media Sources May Be a Poor Indicator of Competitiveness
In relaxing its cross-ownership rules, the FCC noted the number of
television and radio stations on the air since 1975 increased: the number of
radio and television stations increased by approximately 76 and 83.5
percent, respectively.111 It is a mistake, however, to confuse the number of
media outlets with the robustness of competition in the marketplace of
ideas.
Ordinarily for commodity goods with a downward sloping demand
curve an increase in output is a good proxy of increased competitiveness.
But in the media industry, the increase in outlets delivering news “has
generally not meant covering a broader range of stories.”112

Media

industries may differ from other industries for several reasons.
First, “the number of independently owned media outlets in a given
could eliminate their back offices, duplicate news bureaus, etc. The joint venture could
better utilize its scarce resources, and achieve significant cost savings unattainable outside
the venture. This joint venture may produce a lower-cost newspaper, with a lower
newsstand price-so instead of paying fifty cents, one may pay a quarter for the newspaper.
The American Antitrust Institute expressed similar concerns following the computer
system failure of the Voter News Service during the 2002 midterm election. The Voter
News Service is a joint venture among five major TV news organizations (ABC, CBS,
NBC, Fox, and CNN), and the Associated Press, which is designed to produce and analyze
election exit polling information. Until the 1988 election, the major news organizations did
their own exit polling and made their election predictions independently. In 1990, ABC,
NBC, CBS and CNN formed the Voter Research & Surveys, combining their exit polling
operations as a cost saving measure. All six major news organizations now rely on the
same data and the same models, rather than compete to predict election results the most
accurately. Following the 2000 elections, AAI blamed the networks' erroneous reporting
of the presidential election results on the void of competition and urged the government to
break up the VNS. See AAI Calls, Again, For Breakup of Voters News Service (Nov. 19,
2002), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/215.ashx (last visited May 23, 2008).
111
2008 FCC Report, supra note 32, at ¶ 24.
112
Overview, in 2007 PEJ Report, supra note 20.
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market,” as the GAO found, “is not always a good indicator of how many
independently produced local news or other programs are available in a
market.”113
Second, an increase in output (more media outlets) could simply mean
fewer owners controlling more outlets. As discussed supra, between March
1996 and March 2007, the number of commercial radio stations increased
6.8 percent, but the number of radio owners decreased by 39 percent.
Likewise, the number of full-power television stations significantly
increased, while the number of unique television owners decreased. The
number of newspapers remained about the same between 2002 and 2005,
but the number of newspaper owners also declined.114
Third, media sources are not interchangeable or of equal weight.
Some defense counsel in a media merger justify an “all media market,” as
many local outlets carry some news or advertising.

But the empirical

evidence shows the continuing importance of the local daily newspaper,
followed by the local television station in gathering and investigating news.
Thus to observe that 40 media outlets exist in one city may say little about
the competitiveness of the marketplace of ideas.

Typically, many

publications cover discrete commodities (such as autos or real estate), are
targeted for specific religious or ethnic audiences, or are limited to
community events.

Given the “relatively unanimous support” that

consumers “continue predominantly to get their local news from daily
113

In five markets which the GAO surveyed, the television stations were participating
in operating agreements. The five markets were Nashville, Tennessee; Wilkes
Barre/Scranton, Pennsylvania; Springfield, Missouri; Myrtle Beach/Florence, South
Carolina; and Terre Haute, Indiana. For example, in Wilkes Barre/Scranton, the GAO
identified eight television stations. But one owner of two stations participated in an
agreement with a third station and the remaining four television stations participated in two
separate agreements—each agreement covering two stations. Thus, while there are eight
television stations and seven owners in Wilkes Barre/Scranton, there are actually only three
loose commercial groupings in the market. GAO, supra note 68, at 7.
114
See supra note --**.
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newspapers and broadcast television,”115 allowing these two dominant news
sources to merge can pose greater risk to the marketplace of ideas than
allowing a newspaper to acquire other less news-intensive media.116
Fourth, even if two competing television stations had comparable
weight, it is problematic, or as Judge Learned Hand asserted “impossible,”
to treat different news services as “interchangeable.”117
115

In Associated

2008 FCC Report, supra note 32, at ¶ 57.
In 2003, the FCC introduced a “Diversity Index” that sought to give its media
ownership framework an empirical footing. The Diversity Index was modeled on the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) used by the federal antitrust agencies in merger
cases. The FCC selected which media to include based on consumers’ reported
preferences. It then weighted the media based on their popularity (for example, television
stations received a greater weight than newspapers). To apply the Diversity Index in a
specific market, the FCC counted the number of media outlets in the market. Each outlet
of a certain type of media was given an equal weight with every other outlet of the same
type. Finally, the FCC summed the squares of the weighted ownership shares to calculate
the market's Diversity Index score. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected the
FCC’s Diversity Index for a number of reasons, including the equal weighting of outlets.
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 402-3 (3rd Cir. 2004). As the Third
Circuit wrote, “[a] Diversity Index that requires us to accept that a community college
television station makes a greater contribution to viewpoint diversity than a conglomerate
that includes the third-largest newspaper in America [the NEW YORK TIMES] also
requires us to abandon both logic and reality.” The FCC subsequently recognized that its
Diversity Index is an inaccurate tool for measuring diversity, that some aspects of diversity
may be difficult to quantify, and thus abandoned its Diversity Index. 2008 FCC Report,
supra note 32, at ¶¶ 16-17. Professor Eli Noam and DOJ attorney Brian Hill have each
suggested alternatives to the Diversity Index designed to remedy the shortcomings the
Third Circuit identified. Professor Noam proposes adding a measure of the number of
voices in a market to generate a combined number that corrects the concentration index by
giving better scores to markets with more distinct voices. The insight behind this approach
is that one is better off with the choice of more radio stations on the dial or another
newspaper at the kiosk even if these outlets do not draw large crowds. Eli Noam, How to
measure media concentration, available at http://www.citi.columbia.edu/elinoam/FT/8-3004/measure.htm. Mr. Hill proposes an entirely new formula that he argues is better able to
satisfy the major two assumptions that both the FCC and Third Circuit thought were
critical: (1) diversity in a media market should not decrease with ownership concentration;
and (2) the contribution to diversity of an individual entity, its diversity importance, should
increase with the weighted market shares of that entity’s outlets. Brian Hill, Measuring
Media Market Diversity: Concentration, Importance, and Pluralism, 58 FED. COMM. L.J.
169,available at http://www.law.indiana.edu/fclj/pubs/v58/no1/HillPDF.pdf. In this regard,
a recent thoughtful article highlighted the challenges of empirically capturing substantive
viewpoint diversity. See Daniel E. Ho and Kevin M Quinn, Viewpoint Diversity and Media
Consolidation:
An
Empirical
Study,
available
at
http://search.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1121229.
117
AP I, 52 F. Supp. at 372.
116
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Press, newspapers, which were excluded from the dominant AP news
service joint venture, could obtain news from other news services. This did
not mitigate the competition concerns. Nor was the fact that readers could
read the AP news stories in one local newspaper determinative.

A

newspaper reflects the biases and views of its writers, editors, and owners.
One newspaper may downplay and truncate a news wire story; the other
newspaper may carry it as a headline. These are not fungible commodities.
Thus, the media marketplace is not about consumers switching from one
homogeneous product to another. Rather, it should be concerned with the
net increase in consumer welfare from having many competing and diverse
news sources and editorial voices.

As Judge Hand stated about the

marketplace of ideas, “it is only by cross-lights from varying directions that
full illumination can be secured.”118

Unlike restraints on ordinary

commodities (where consumers may turn to less-desirable alternatives but
the overall societal impact is insignificant), for restraints in the media, the
alternatives may be inherently unsatisfactory and the costs imposed on
society may be significant.119
Finally, media markets are subject to their own particular economic
logic. Decisions by broadcasters about how to cover news, for example, are
affected by the number of viewers attracted to “hard” versus “soft” news,
the value advertisers place on reaching those viewers, what competitors are
doing, and the existence (or lack thereof) of public interest requirements.120
IV. SOME PROPOSALS FOR THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
Given the importance of the marketplace of ideas to our democracy and
free-market economy, the importance of traditional media to the
marketplace of ideas, and the unique dangers of market failure in this
118

AP I, 52 F. Supp. at 372.
See AP II, 326 U.S. at 28 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
120
Hamilton, supra note 82, at 13-24.
119
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marketplace, it is unwise to continue the current ad hoc policies toward
media consolidation. We argue in this Part why it is time for the Obama
administration to examine the way information flows in the marketplace of
ideas, the potential bottlenecks, and mechanisms to promote competition in
the marketplace of ideas. We recommend first a coherent media policy,
second, an agenda for the agencies to look beyond a merger’s impact on
advertising rates and more empirical work on media mergers’ impact on the
marketplace of ideas, and finally ways the government can promote access
to the marketplace of ideas.
A. A Coherent Media Policy
Congress recently held a range of hearings on media-related topics,
including specific media mergers, the “digital future,” net neutrality, piracy,
the role of private equity, as well as FCC oversight hearings. Ideally, a
national media policy would emerge from such hearings, including media
specific legislation and new ways to further the other goals of any media
policy, such as localism and diversity.121
Other countries, including Germany, England, Norway, Sweden, and
the Netherlands, have taken steps to limit concentration and promote
editorial independence.122 Some possibilities discussed by Professor Baker
and others include requiring more extensive pre-merger review, applying
presumptions against media mergers under certain defined circumstances,
barring certain types of transactions entirely, explicitly taking editorial
independence into account, giving journalists a say or even a veto in merger
decisions, imposing some non content-based access requirements on
dominant firms, changing tax and subsidy policies, and strengthening
121

It would be useful for Congress during the next Administration to identify best
practices relating to media ownership and ways to promote minority ownership.
122
For a survey of various nations’ approaches to media mergers, see ORG. FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION
&
DEV.,
MEDIA
MERGERS
16
(2003),
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/3/17372985.pdf.
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antitrust enforcement through more objective criteria (e.g., presumption of
illegality based on market share).123
Today’s ad hoc piece-meal policy work by each regulatory fiefdom is
inadequate. Congress needs to intercede, clearly define the policy goals,
and legislate media-specific competition laws. To accomplish this task,
Congress should establish a commission composed of diverse stakeholders
to examine further these issues on media ownership, conduct hearings, and
make recommendations, which Congress can implement. Notably in the
last great depression of the 1930s, the congressional Temporary National
Economic Committee investigated the state of competition in various
industries. As the DOJ later reported, this empirical analysis was helpful.
The factual data from this effort “revealed the urgent need for a vigorous
attack on monopoly power and concentration of economic resources and
gave added impetus in 1938 and subsequently to the effort to reverse or at
least check the trend toward concentration which had prevailed for most of
the preceding half century, and to overcome some of the obstacles to
effective enforcement of the antitrust laws.”124
Nor should media policy be left exclusively to one federal agency’s
domain. Each agency should have a defined role in preserving the
marketplace of ideas. The roles should be complementary, and further the
overall policy objectives. Today, apart from occasional consultations about
a particular transaction or new policy, the federal agencies tend to operate in
a vacuum. A telecommunications merger may not necessarily violate the
Clayton Act, but fail the FCC’s ownership restrictions, or vice versa. In
essence, one does not necessarily follow from the other.125
123

BAKER, supra note 9, at 163-89.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, A STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
ANTITRUST LAWS AND CURRENT PROBLEMS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, SUBMITTED
TO THE U.S. SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MONOPOLY 9 (May 23, 1952).
125
See, e.g., U.S. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 358 U.S. 334, 350 n. 18 (1959) (stating that
124
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B. Further Empirical Work on Media Mergers’ Impact Beyond Advertising
Markets
For some media industries, the federal antitrust agencies examine only
the merger’s likely impact on advertising rates126 (and do not revisit the
market post-merger to determine if it predicted correctly).127 But reduced
price competition for advertising and programming is not the only (or even
primary) potential anticompetitive effect from a media merger. Indeed, if
the focus were solely advertising, one misses an important part of the
while the FCC may deny applications under its public interest standard where antitrust
violations exist, “its approval of transactions which might involve Sherman Act violations
is not a determination that the Sherman Act has not been violated, and therefore cannot
forestall the United States from subsequently challenging those transactions.”).
126
In the 2002 Biennial Review Order, the FCC defined advertising as the primary
economic market in which broadcast stations and newspapers derive their primary sources
of revenue. The FCC concluded that for purchasers of advertising time, “newspapers,
television, and radio are not good substitutes and therefore make up distinct product
markets.” Thus, the only “economic” market in which broadcast stations and newspapers
compete is advertising, and thus the only relevant product market is advertising. Report &
Order and Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review et al., MB
Docket Nos. 02-277, 01-235, 01-317, 00-244, and 03-130 ¶ 331 (released July 2, 2003).
The FCC in liberalizing its media cross-ownership rules in 2008 continued to support that
conclusion and found “no reason to deviate from the defined product market.” The FCC
continues to believe that newspaper/broadcast combinations “cannot adversely affect
competition in any relevant product market.” 2008 FCC Report, supra note 32, at ¶ 39 n.
131 (emphasis added). This is nonsense. In reaching this position, the FCC relied on
statements by media companies Gannett and Hearst (who have an interest in the outcome
of the FCC’s rules) that “very little advertising substitution exists between daily
newspapers and broadcast outlets.” Report & Order and Notice of Proposed Rule Making,
2002 Biennial Regulatory Review et al., MB Docket Nos. 02-277, 01-235, 01-317, 00-244,
and 03-130 ¶ 332 (released July 2, 2003). The FCC ignores Gannett’s and Hearst’s
contrary representations in their SEC filings which emphasizes the competition between
newspapers and television. See Gannett Co., Inc. 10-K, filed Feb. 28, 2008 (newspapers
and affiliated Web sites “compete with other media for advertising principally on the basis
of their performance in helping to sell the advertisers’ products or services and their
advertising rates. . . . Most of the company’s newspapers compete with other newspapers
published in nearby cities and towns and with free-distribution and paid-advertising
weeklies, as well as other print and non-print media, including magazines, television, direct
mail, cable television, radio, outdoor advertising and Internet media.”); Hearst Argyle
Television Inc. 10-K, filed Feb. 28, 2008 (its broadcast television stations “compete for
advertising revenues with other broadcast television stations, as well as with a variety of
other media, such as newspapers, radio stations, magazines, outdoor advertising, transit
advertising, yellow page directories, direct mail, the Internet and MVPDs serving the same
market.”).
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competitive landscape.
All media compete to varying degrees with other media for
advertising dollars.

This is of particular importance in the newspaper,

television, and radio industries, where the competition extends beyond
advertising prices. National newspapers, such as the NEW YORK TIMES and
WALL STREET JOURNAL, compete against other media for national
advertisements; daily newspapers compete against craigslist for classified
ads. By June 2006, Google had 45% of advertising revenue for search
engines; but when it comes to news, Google is primarily an aggregator with
little investment in the traditional newsgathering function.128 Likewise,
craigslist in some cities is a significant competitor for online classified ads;
but craigslist has no traditional news gathering function.129 Thus, Google
and craigslist may be formidable competitors to the traditional media for
certain advertisers, but are not competitive threats for newsgathering. This
increase in advertising competition does not translate into competition for
better journalism (indeed the reverse may be true as many major
newspapers are downsizing staff, reducing newshole, and eliminating news
bureaus). If advertising were the sole focus, the traditional news media in a
community could freely merge given craigslist, Google, and other vehicles
for online advertising.
It is important to any media policy to consider media mergers’ impact
on other policy objectives besides lower advertising rates.

Media

consolidation may adversely affect, for example, nonprice editorial
127

See Stucke, Behavioral Economists, supra note 96, at 575-79.
Online, in 2007 PEJ Report, supra note 20. The 100 largest media companies (in
terms of 2005 revenues) owned 16 of the top 20 popular online news sites, as ranked by
Nielsen/Net Ratings. Id.
129
Started as a hobby by Craig Newmark in early 1995, craigslist provides local
classifieds and forums for 450 cities worldwide. With more than 9 billion page views and
more than 30 million people using craigslist each month, the Internet site publishes each
month more than 30 million new classified ads and 2 million new job listings. Craigslist,
128
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competition,130 and non-economic policy considerations, such as localism
and diversity.
The next issue is what mechanism should be implemented to promote
these values, and what should be antitrust’s role? The DOJ historically and
recently has challenged anticompetitive restraints in the print media based
in part on its impact on the marketplace of ideas, specifically the loss of
editorial competition.131 The DOJ is challenging currently the loss of the
editorial competition involving abuses of a newspaper joint operating
agreement.132

In its complaint involving two leading West Virginia

newspapers, the United States alleged how local daily newspapers, such as
the CHARLESTON GAZETTE and the CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, provide a
unique package of attributes for their readers, which other media cannot
substitute.133

In challenging a market allocation scheme between the

nation’s two largest alternative newsweekly publishers, the DOJ described
the competition between the defendants’ alternative newsweeklies. Readers

Factsheet, http://www.craigslist.org/about/factsheet.html (last visited May 23, 2008).
130
It is well accepted, and a matter of everyday experience, that price is not the sole
measure of competition. Companies can, and often do, compete on other dimensions, such
as quality, service, and innovation. Newspapers historically invested in editorial content to
attract readers, which in turn attracted advertisers.
131
See, e.g., U.S. v. Citizen Publ’g Co., 280 F. Supp. 978, 985 (D. Ariz. 1968), aff’d,
394 U.S. 131 (1969); U.S. v. Times Mirror Co., 274 F. Supp. 606, 612 (C.D. Cal. 1967),
aff’d, 390 U.S. 712 (1968); Cmty. Publishers, Inc. v. Donrey Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1146,
1166 (W.D. Ark. 1995), aff’d, 139 F.3d 1180 (8th Cir. 1998).
132
Complaint, U.S. v. Daily Gazette Co., Civ. Act. No. 2:07-0329 (S.D. W.Va. filed
May 22, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f223400/223469.htm.
133
The DOJ’s complaint notes how newspapers provide national, state, and local news
in a timely manner and in a convenient, hardcopy format. The news stories featured in such
newspapers are more detailed, when compared to the news reported by radio or television,
and they cover a wide range of topics of interest to local readers, not just major news
highlights. Newspapers are portable and allow the reader to read the news, advertisements,
and other information at his or her own convenience. Readers also value other features of
local daily newspapers, such as calendars of local events, movie and TV listings, classified
advertisements, commercial advertisements, legal notices, comics, syndicated columns, and
obituaries. Most readers of local daily newspapers in the Charleston area do not consider
weekly newspapers, radio news, television news, Internet news, or any other media to be
adequate substitutes for the two local daily newspapers serving the Charleston area.
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and advertisers benefited with better editorial coverage, heavily discounted
advertising rates, and higher quality service.134 The U.S. Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”), under Chairman Pitofsky, was sensitive to the
marketplace of ideas in the merger between AOL and Time Warner.135
But for other media industries, such as radio and television, the federal
antitrust agencies examine the merger’s impact only on advertising rates.
Considering a merger’s impact on editorial competition for some media and
not others makes little sense.
But the larger issue is whether this is suitable for antitrust inquiry.
Some argue that the competition agencies should look beyond a media
merger's impact on advertising rates and services and consider its impact on
nonprice competition, which includes editorial competition136 and choice.137
Others argue that editorial competition involves non-economic concerns
better left to other agencies, such as the FCC. Although the federal courts
have found that editorial competition among newspapers is cognizable

134

For example, in challenging the defendants’ market allocation scheme, the United
States discussed the evidence of the intense editorial competition. The defendants’
alternative newsweeklies responded to the other’s editorial changes and improvements by
introducing new or better features or increasing investigative journalism to recapture the
readers' attention to its publication. The different, and at times opposing, views and
positions of the defendants’ competing alternative newsweeklies provided “readers with
alternative viewpoints of important local events affecting social, political, esthetic, and
moral issues.” Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Village Voice Media, LLC,
and NT Media, LLC, Civil Act. No. 1:03CV0164 (N.D. Oh. filed 02/03/2003), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200700/200715.htm.
135
America Online and Time Warner, Dkt. No. C-3989. See Federal Trade Comm’n, Press
Release, FTC Approves AOL/Time Warner Merger with Conditions (Dec. 14, 2000),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/12/aol.htm.
136
See Stucke & Grunes, supra note 6, at 270–73.
137
See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using The “Consumer Choice” Approach
To Antitrust Law, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 175, 207 (2007). For example, if the broadcast
networks were to combine their news operations, but each independently set its own
advertising rates, the merger might not be challenged if the marketplace of ideas were
excluded from the analysis. Even though the evening news would remain free, and the
advertising rates would remain competitive, the nonprice competition among the news
networks would be eliminated. This is because the loss of this editorial diversity could not
be readily replaced.
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under the federal competition laws,138 there remains the concern that a
particular administration may use editorial competition as a vehicle to
punish or support a media company, based on the media’s views toward the
administration and its policies.139 Despite these differences, we do not
advocate that the government agencies make normative judgments about
whether the WALL STREET JOURNAL would be a better newspaper in the
hands of the Murdochs, Grahams, or Sulzbergers.
138

The more recent decisions are United States v. Daily Gazette Co., No. 2:0703292008, WL 2895899, at *6 (S.D.W.Va. June 19, 2008); Reilly v. MediaNews Group,
Inc., No. C 06-04332 SI, 2007 WL 1068292, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (Judge Illston held that
the alleged loss of editorial competition was sufficient for antitrust injury). See also Hawaii
v. Gannett Pac. Corp., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1249–50 (D. Haw. 1999), aff’d, 203 F.3d 832
(9th Cir. 1999).
139
President Lyndon B. Johnson, for example, permitted a merger between two
Houston banks in exchange for favorable coverage in the Houston Chronicle. MICHAEL R.
BESCHLOSS, TAKING CHARGE: THE JOHNSON WHITE HOUSE TAPES, 1963-64 (1997) ([LBJ
wants a letter from saying] ""the paper is going to support your administration as long as
you're there. Sincerely, your friend, John Jones.'' . . . I don't see a damn thing wrong with
that . . . Both Justice and Treasury will un-cock me right quick if I [approve the merger] . . .
and I ain't going to do it, George, unless [Chronicle president] John Jones is willing to say
to me that he's my friend.”). After receiving the letter, the Administration cleared the bank
merger.
President Nixon used the antitrust laws as a sword of Damocles against the media
networks. President Nixon in 1971 discussed intimidating the nation's three major
television networks by keeping the constant threat of an antitrust suit hanging over them.
In a July 2, 1971 taped recorded discussion, aide Charles W. Colson told Nixon that
whether filing an antitrust case against ABC, NBC and CBS “is good or not is perhaps not
the major political consideration. But keeping this case in a pending status gives us one hell
of a club on an economic issue that means a great deal to those three networks ... something
of a sword of Damocles.” Nixon responded, “Our gain is more important than the
economic gain. We don't give a goddam about the economic gain. Our game here is solely
political. ... As far as screwing them is concerned, I'm very glad to do it.”
“If the threat of screwing them is going to help us more with their programming than
doing it, then keep the threat,” said Nixon. “Don't screw them now. [Otherwise] they'll
figure that we're done.” As for the antitrust actions, the White House kept the DOJ from
filing suit until April 1972, when the government accused the networks of restraining trade
and monopolizing prime-time entertainment with their own programs. The suits were
dismissed without prejudice in 1974 after the government was unable to identify the
requested documents. BERNARD M. HOLLANDER, ORAL HISTORY: FIFTY-EIGHT YEARS IN
THE ANTITRUST DIVISION: 1949-2007, at 174-79 (June 2008). The Ford administration
renewed the complaints and subsequent consent decrees curtailed prime-time productions
by the networks. Walter Pincus & George Lardner Jr., Nixon Hoped Antitrust Threat
Would Sway Network Coverage, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1997, at A1, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/nixon/120197tapes.htm.
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Instead, one mechanism to promote a vibrant marketplace of ideas and
avoid these normative judgments may be in revising the structural
ownership requirements (such as FCC caps on ownership). In addition,
antitrust should have a role if direct evidence of market power exists.140
Direct evidence of past anticompetitive restraints in that market, or natural
experiments in other geographic markets (for example, evidence of
anticompetitive effects where one of the merging parties recently acquired
its direct competitor) should establish a prima facie violation under Section
7 of the Clayton Act.

Another category of potential concern is the

transmission/content arena, when a company that dominates the
transmission of information seeks to enter the content side.141
140

See Stucke & Grunes, supra note 6, at 299-302.
This was the situation in the AT&T case. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 223–24, aff’d sub
nom. Md. v. U.S., 460 U.S. at 1001. And it may arise in a merger between a major cable
operator and movie studio (the anticompetitive effects of which prompted in part the 1992
Cable Act). Congress found, in enacting the 1992 Cable Act, that a cable operator has an
incentive to favor its affiliated programmers. But a cable operator also has an incentive to
offer an attractive package of programs to its subscribers. When these two incentives are in
conflict, “the operator may, as a rational profit-maximizer, compromise the consumers'
interests.” Time Warner Ent. Co. v. U.S., 211 F.3d 1313, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1167 (2001). This scenario arose in a consent decree involving Time
Warner's acquisition of Turner Broadcasting System. Time Warner Inc., Turner Broad.
Sys., Inc., Tele-Communications, Inc., and Liberty Media Corp., Dkt. No. C-3709 (Feb. 3,
1997). The FTC believed that its enforcement action was wholly consistent with the goals
of Congress in enacting the 1992 Cable Act in providing greater access to programming
and promoting competition in local cable markets. Statement of Chairman Pitofsky, and
Commissioners Steiger and Varney in Time Warner Inc., Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., TeleCommunications, Inc., and Liberty Media Corp., Dkt. No. C-3709 (Feb. 3, 1997). One of
the consent decree provisions required Time Warner to place a rival to its newly acquired
CNN on certain of its cable systems. The FTC responded that this narrowly drawn
provision was designed to restore the incentives Time Warner would otherwise have had to
carry rivals to CNN but for the fact of this acquisition. The FTC believed that Time
Warner's acquisition of CNN, as alleged in the complaint, gave it both the ability and
incentive to make entry of competing news services more difficult, by denying them access
to its extensive distribution system. Letter to Brian P. Lamb, C-SPAN, from FTC Secretary
Donald S. Clark, in response to Lamb's comment about the FTC's consent decree regarding
the acquisition of Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. by Time Warner Inc., and TeleCommunications, Inc.'s and Liberty Media Corporation's Proposed Acquisitions of
Interests in Time Warner, Dkt. No. C-3709 (Feb. 3, 1997). The FTC observed that courts
have upheld against First Amendment challenge regulations specifically designed to
address competitive concerns arising from vertically-integrated cable companies' monopoly
141
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C. Promoting Access to the Marketplace of Ideas
Given traditional media’s high fixed costs and significant entry
barriers,142 concentrated media ownership can hinder competition.

The

Obama administration should affirmatively examine how information flows
in the marketplace of ideas, and what remedial steps can remove any
bottlenecks.
The Supreme Court of late has displayed great faith in regulation to
diminish the likelihood of and remedy anticompetitive harm.143 It would be
a mistake, however, to believe that regulatory dictates alone could replicate
a competitive marketplace of ideas. In addition to the risks of imperfect
information and regulatory capture, government regulators, unlike private
actors (who, at times, bear the costs of their mistakes), may undertake
anticompetitive actions because of weaker incentives to avoid mistakes,

control over distribution. What is also interesting is that the FTC abstained from
determining which rival to CNN must be carried on the cable network. “In this case, there
is even greater reason to avoid a more intrusive role, since programming content would be
unavoidably implicated-the selection of one competitor over another inevitably determines
to some degree the content of the new entry. In addition, excessive involvement in the
selection process could conflict with the goal that the antitrust laws, and antitrust remedies,
are intended to protect competition, not competitors.” Statement of Chairman Pitofsky, and
Commissioners Steiger and Varney in Time Warner Inc., Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., TeleCommunications, Inc., and Liberty Media Corp., Dkt. No. C-3709 (Feb. 3, 1997). A similar
concern arose in the AOL/Time Warner merger, prompting restrictions against AOL Time
Warner from discriminating on the basis of corporate affiliation in the transmission of
content. See Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, America Online,
Inc.,
and
Time
Warner
Inc.,
Dkt.
No.
C-3989,
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aolanalysis.pdf; see also FTC Backs AOL-Time Warner
Merger, J. RECORD, Dec. 15, 2000, available at 2000 WL 14300520 (quoting Chairman
Robert Pitofsky) (“Our concern here was with access, that these two powerful companies
would create barriers that would injure competitors”); AOL Merger Clears Last Big
Hurdle, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2000, at A1 (quoting Commissioner Leary) (“I had and I
continue to have concerns about these content issues.”).
142
Television, cable, and radio have regulatory barriers and high fixed costs.
Newspapers have high fixed “first copy” costs. Publishing the first copy of a newspaper is
high, given the reporting and editorial costs, the infrastructure to print newspapers, and
costs to solicit advertisers. The marginal cost of producing the second, third, and fourth
copies is very low and remains low up to the newspaper’s printing capacity. See WORLD
BANK, supra note--, at 183.
143
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 412 (2004).
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political myopia, and the lack of direct accountability to the public.144 As
Alfred Kahn stated, the “essential task of public policy in a free enterprise
system should be to preserve the framework of a fair field and no favors,
letting the results take care of themselves.”145 Similarly, to prevent the
formation of monopolies, the United States historically focused on
maintaining

competitive market

structures,

rather than

regulatory

dictates.146
Thus, the best remedy for media monopolies is to prevent their
formation, through (i) structural mechanisms (such as cross-ownership
restrictions and caps on ownership both nationally and in local markets), (ii)
144

François Moreau, The Role of the State in Evolutionary Economics, 28 CAMBRIDGE
J. OF ECON. 847, 850 (2004). For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s
merger review policies were recently criticized for relying on data supplied by the
regulated entities, rather than conducting its own independent fact gathering and analysis of
market definition. Sara Stefanini, Think Tank Urges FERC to Reform Merger Policies,
COMPETITION
LAW
360,
March
15,
2007,
available
at
http://competition.law360.com/Secure/ViewArticle.aspx?id=20553; see also Comments of
Diana Moss at FERC Technical Conference on Electricity Merger Policy (March 14,
2007), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/Archives/FERC_comments.ashx.
145
Alfred E. Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, 67 HARV. L. REV. 28, 39 (1953).
146
Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: The Matter of
Remedies, 91 GEO. L.J. 169, 178-79 (2002) (FTC enforcement efforts during the 1990s
were directed toward preserving open access to markets). Thus, Section 1 focuses on
concerted activity to eliminate competitors, and raise entry barriers. Section 7 prevents
mergers that tend to create a monopoly. Attempts to monopolize violate Section 2. See
Maurice E. Stucke, Should the Government Prosecute Monopolies?, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1116463.
The 1996
Telecommunications Act was deregulatory in its approach, continuing the shift of the
telecommunications industry away from a heavily regulated industry (with behavioral
restrictions) to the aspired open competition (with structural restrictions). Congress's
intent, as expressed by the 1996 Act, is that the antitrust analysis should be primarily
conducted by the federal antitrust agencies and not by the FCC. While the FCC's “public
interest” standard and ownership control regulations touch upon antitrust issues, Congress
wanted the DOJ and the FTC independently and carefully to review media mergers and
their impact on competition in the marketplace of ideas. The legislative history of the
savings clause to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 shows that the FCC regulatory
scheme does not preempt antitrust review of media mergers generally, and the marketplace
of ideas specifically. Stucke & Grunes, supra note 6, at 288-94. However, aside from
political and ideological concerns about lax or zealous antitrust enforcement, conventional
antitrust policy is not easy to apply in media markets. See Howard Shelanski, Antitrust Law
as Mass-Media Regulation: Can Merger Standards Protect the Public Interest?, 94 CAL.
L. REV. 371, 373 (2006).
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removal of bottlenecks and any government-imposed entry barriers, and
(iii) active and informed antitrust enforcement to enjoin anticompetitive
media mergers. The Obama administration, for example, should be vigilant
of any onerous government regulations that reduce the media’s
independence or distort the provision of information. This means keeping
the media independent and free from governmental control or improper
influence.147
The Obama administration should also examine mechanisms to foster
the free flow of information. Under an evolutionary economic perspective,
not only is experimentation critical, but also the dissemination of
information of that experimentation and feedback thereto.148 Division of
labor has increased specialization of knowledge, whereby individuals know
much about a limited area. This specialization of knowledge can increase
transaction costs (namely, ascertaining the measurement and performance
characteristics of goods and services outside one’s area of expertise).149
Moreover, the dispersion of information in society and the attendant search
costs can inhibit our understanding of the sources of poor economic
performance and thwart dynamic efficiency. This is precisely where the
government can play a key role in further “integrating the dispersed
knowledge essential to efficient production in a world of specialization.”150
In facilitating “the greatest possible centralization of information, and
147

The World Bank noted, “[h]igher levels of perceived media freedom or
independence are associated with lower levels of perceived corruption, regardless of
differences in a country’s level of income.” WORLD BANK, supra note--, at 182.
148
A positive feedback loop for example may emerge from the learning effects from
diffused technologies. For example, as end-users experiment and alter a particular
technology, the suppliers learn from this diffusion. In the next round, the suppliers, in turn,
can offer this greater diffusion of offerings, which various users can further modify.
RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC
CHANGE 402 (1982); see also Moreau, supra note 144, at 869.
149
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 73
(2005).
150
Id., at 164.
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diffusion of it from the centre,”151 the government can more cheaply inform
market participants. This does not mean having the government evaluate or
filter the information’s content. Instead, the government can evaluate what
additional steps to promote the free flow of information, and reduce search
costs.152 These steps may include creating antitrust safe harbors for private
individuals

to

(1) publicly

disseminate

price,

wage,

and

other

information,153 or (2) promote novel forms of information dissemination,
such as prediction markets, whereby individuals bet on future outcomes.154
To foster accountability—and lower the media’s search costs—the

151

JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 123 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale
Univ. Press 2003).
152
For example, the government can promote benchmarks so that consumers can
readily compare prices of goods, such as retail fuel prices, mattresses and cell phone
services. In markets with many sellers, buyers may have high search costs to identify the
lowest-priced seller. Increased price transparency may make it easier for buyers to compare
prices and bargain shop, reducing their search costs. Retail fuel prices can be moderately
affected if websites publish the comparative prices at local pumps on a timely basis, and
government should be vigilant against any private restraints to inhibit this transparency;
and in locations where private resources do not make this information available, local
governments might well step in.
153
Making historical price, supply, or cost data may also enable each competitor to
benchmark its performance to an industry standard. For such exchanges, the federal
antitrust agencies have outlined some steps to mitigate litigation risks by (1) having a third
party, e.g., a purchaser, government agency, consultant, academic institution, or trade
association, collect the data, (2) basing the information provided by the participants on data
more than three months old, (3) having at least five providers report data upon which each
disseminated statistic is based, with no individual provider’s data representing more than
25 percent on a weighted basis of that statistic, and (4) aggregating any information
disseminated such that it would not allow recipients to identify the prices charged or
compensation paid by any particular provider. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE
COMM’N, STATEMENTS OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE 63 (1996),
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0000.pdf; see also Letter from R. Hewitt Pate,
Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., to Diana West, Internationally
Board-Certified
Lactation
Consultants
(May
25,
2004),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/busreview/203831.pdf (explaining that the Division would
not challenge the collection of fee information for a survey among competitors, which
would be collected following the principles outlined in the Health Care Guidelines). For a
further discussion of the antitrust risks of the dissemination of price information, see
generally Maurice E. Stucke, Evaluating the Risks of Increased Price Transparency, 19
ANTITRUST 81 (2005).
154
See KENNETH J. ARROW ET AL., AEI-BROOKINGS JOINT CTR., STATEMENT ON
PREDICTION MARKETS 2 (2007), available at http://wwm.com/abstract=984584.
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government can also promote its own transparency and remove restraints in
accessing such information.155
CONCLUSION
Although some may argue that the current recession deserves far
greater attention than a coherent media policy, this is short-sighted. A
vibrant marketplace of ideas is too important to our democracy. The media
can inform the electorate, serve as a watchdog on corporate and political
organizations, enhance market efficiency, and advance the discourse of
public policy.

One cannot rely on flawed laissez-faire beliefs that

unregulated market forces will provide the efficient level of information.
Nor can one assume that the current haphazard patchwork of media policies
will remedy the current ailments in the media industry today or promote the
unrestrained flow of information.
Instead, the Obama administration must undertake a more empirical
analyses of how media markets work, and ensure that any competition
policy toward media mergers be in furtherance of, and driven by, a national
media policy, as set by Congress. Sole reliance on enforcement by the FCC
or federal antitrust agencies has proven to be too ad hoc, too haphazard, and
not particularly effective. Aside from political and ideological concerns
about lax or zealous antitrust enforcement, conventional antitrust policy is
not easy to apply in media markets, and a combination of new legislation
and more informed antitrust enforcement to: (i) promote, or at least not
diminish, the media’s contribution to the marketplace of ideas; (ii) have
antitrust merger policies complement FCC policy, which together should
provide some of the necessary legal framework for a vibrant marketplace of

155

The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000), for example, was enacted
to foster this transparency. For a critique of its success and shortcomings in recent years,
see generally ALASDAIR ROBERTS, BLACKED OUT: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (2006).
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ideas; and (iii) understand from a 21st Century perspective, all of the
values, including noneconomic values, such as localism and diversity, that
are important to preserving a healthy marketplace of ideas.

